The US military involvement in the ongoing fighting in Iran is not limited to that country. US efforts pouring into the conflict will likely be greeted by China seeking to take advantage of the US’s distraction to expand its influence in the region and to assert itself as a major global actor. In this brief, we argue that the US will continue to allow the conflict in Iran to undermine US influence in a critical region of the world, even as China is afforded new opportunities to expand its influence in the Indo-Pacific. This is not a new US foreign policy. The US’s tendency to overcommit in certain regions of the world inevitably leads to an undermining of US influence in other regions.

The US military is at a breaking point, and it’s being felt all the way over in the Indo–Pacific. Resources meant for confronting aggressors and supporting US allies are being diverted to Iran. THAAD and Patriot missile defence batteries, meant to guard against North Korean ballistic missiles, have been transferred to other locations around the world. The US’s most elite fighting troops  Marines based in Japan, are being pulled from their posts to support other military operations. Aircraft carrier strike groups meant to patrol the waters of the Western Pacific are being redeployed on “tailored” missions to the Middle East. The US military is running critically short of ammunition, just as China is rapidly modernising its own military.  Seoul and Tokyo are closely watching U.S. deliberations on its post-Iraq future, fearing that a quick withdrawal from the Middle East could undermine Washington’s ability to handle security threats in the Indo-Pacific region.

U.S. strategy in the Iran conflict represents a new chapter in a pernicious strategic habit of the United States of embarking in limited portions in protracted conflicts in the Middle East. Our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan started as modest endeavours with defined objectives and limited force profiles, but escalated into persistent, widespread, and long-lasting conflicts requiring layered investment in ongoing surveillance, force protection, and complex logistics. Our new conflict with Iran is even more multifaceted and demands greater investment of resources accordingly. It is therefore important to consider the true cost to the nation of disengaging from conflict with Iran. This cost will not be in dollars and cents alone, but in strain on resources, time, and capacity to compete in the principal competition of the century. Adding troops or missile batteries to the Middle East would likely draw on some of the same military assets and reduce the military’s ability to deter war over Taiwan, to support allies in Korea, and to respond to a crisis in the Western Pacific.

China is not siding with Iran in the same way that the U.S. has in the past. Instead, Beijing seems to be playing it cool, wary of the “Middle East trap” into which the U.S. has periodically lured itself, only to see it undermine American influence elsewhere on the planet. Publicly, China supports a peaceful resolution to the standoff between Iran and the U.S. and has called on both sides to exercise restraint. At the same time, however, China has rebuked Washington for its belligerent rhetoric, a stance viewed positively in the Global South, where public and official opinion is generally cool to the idea of the U.S. launching war in a foreign country. Yet Beijing is at the same time conducting the evacuation of its citizens from Iran and keeping a close eye on developments in the U.S. It has also offered conditional backing to Iran. Operating via proxy is one way in which China appears to be acquiring access to assets and influence without paying the full cost.

The greatest cost of this war will be the diversion of attention and resources to a conflict that offers the U.S. and its allies little in terms of strategic objectives. The troops and ships now engaged in combat operations in Ukraine are unlikely to be rapidly redeployed to the Asia-Pacific, thus removing a significant source of pressure on China in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Beijing will be able to conduct more assertive naval patrols in those waterways, increase pressure on its immediate neighbours, and conduct more effective diplomatic coercion and negotiation. China’s military modernisation efforts will also gain space to move forward unhindered. In summary, the U.S. will be fighting a war of limited objectives, while China will be working to solidify key elements of its national power. Our Superpowers of Change list has evolved, but here’s a quick look at how two Superpowers are currently doing – one dealing with a crisis, the other amassing wealth.

What does this mean for East Asia? U.S. allies and partners will be eager to know whether the United States has the capability and strategy to defend against simultaneous and/or sustained attacks across an entire theatre. South Korea will likely be concerned that its dwindling missile defence capabilities will be unable to handle a North Korean attack. Japan will reassess the credibility of its own extended deterrence. North Korea will likely be more inclined to test longer-range missiles more frequently. Taiwan will be forced to reevaluate the likelihood of increased Chinese pressure in the wake of a U.S. strategy that limits its ability to effectively respond. The implications of a US conflict with Iran for security in the ASEAN States could be further complicated by the possibility that some of these states might choose to maintain a low profile due to uncertainty regarding US resolve and effectiveness in confronting Iran. The US-Iran conflict is yet another issue affecting the evolving strategic dynamics across the Indo-Pacific.

We still have a few moves left in this strategic chess match. Getting the most out of them will require savvy and discipline. First, the U.S. government needs to set clear, achievable objectives regarding Iran that do not lead to a mission creep into a larger conflict. It is critical that the United States rapidly replenishes its stores of interceptor missiles for its existing defence systems and returns its naval assets to its Asia-Pacific duties as promptly as possible. In the long run, the U.S. government would do well to invest in strengthened trilateral security cooperation with Japan and South Korea to turn what could be a temporary deficiency in policy maker attention into a moment of lasting strength. Finally, over the next few weeks and months, the United States has an interest in communicating its perspective and intentions to China—lest that other great power misunderstand what is happening as the U.S. loses focus on Iran. To conduct great-power competition effectively, the United States cannot continue to pour blood and treasure into a small overseas cauldron with no discernible end state.

The ongoing conflict in Iran is yet another example of how US grand strategy can become mired in short-term crises that divert attention away from problems that demand sustained attention on a global basis. In threatening to attack Iran, US policy continues to divert resources away from East Asia at a time when the US cannot afford to lose strategically to China in a region it cannot ignore. Even as China has not sought to foment instability, its gain from the US’s continued withdrawal from the region is increasingly evident and growing by the day. The US’s further entanglement in the Middle East will only serve to exacerbate a deteriorating strategic position as it is pitted against a robust and ascendant China on its side of the planet.

Simon Hutagalung is a retired Indonesian diplomat. His views are his own.

Blumenthal, D. (2026, March 9). Five takeaways on China and the Iran war. American Enterprise Institute. 

Pettyjohn, S., & Sheers, P. (2026, March 9). Can the United States sustain its war against Iran? And what does it mean for the Indo-Pacific? Centre for a New American Security. 

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