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This article is part of the Buddhism and International Relations article series, edited by Raghav Dua.

There is a rich tradition of dialectics within the many schools of Buddhist philosophy. Whilst it is impossible to cover the richness of all these forms of analysis and debate, the Mādhyamaka school (or the ‘Middle-Way’) resonates strongly with the interests of IR because of its unique account of relations that stem, in large part, from its use of dialectical analysis. Negative dialectics remains the hallmark of the Middle-Way as conceived by Nāgārjuna around the 2nd Century, and even today the 14th Dalai Lama is quite open in his favour toward dialectical thinking (Central Tibetan Administration, 2010).  The Gelugpa School in Tibet continues its centuries-old dialectical practice as a way to integrate analytical reasoning alongside sutra, tantra, and yogic practices with dialectics as one of the five main curriculum topics in Geluk monastic institutions (Duckworth, 2022). Even though this sometimes tends to scholasticism, the goal, then as now, is for thinking to not fall into either side of substantialism/eternalism (the view of an unchanging self and permanent/causeless creator – or the belief in Being) or nihilism (that there is nothing and no continuity – or the belief in Non-Being) (see Institute Of Buddhist Dialectics, 2013).

In an earlier article in this series, Long (2023) has shown how the Buddhist ontology of a radically interdependent and impermanent world offers a very different way of thinking through ourselves and IR. In this short article, I will complement this approach, aiming to show how dialectics in Mādhyamaka pushes our thinking to go beyond the ‘common-sensical’ appearance of the object/subject as separate, independent, static, and to replace this with conditions and relations as inherent to all things. In particular, I will focus on Nāgārjuna’s dialectical method, its scepticism, its emphasis on negation, and how it ultimately deepened the Buddhist conceptualization of Śūnyatā (‘Emptiness’) and Pratītyasamutpāda (‘Dependent Origination’ or what I prefer to call ‘Interdependent Co-arising’ as this better captures its relational content) leading to a profound notion of relations within our phenomenal world – for a detailed discussion see Brincat (2020). I conclude by showing that this cosmology of deep relationalism has profound implications for how we can think of the ‘We’ – the ‘cosmopolis’ and the ‘earth’– in IR today.

Dialectics in Mādhyamaka

Nāgārjuna (conventionally placed between 150–250 CE) is widely seen as the founder of the Mādhyamaka tradition and one of the greatest of all Eastern philosophers (see Westhoff, 2009). In the milieu of Indian society during this time, intense metaphysical debate revolved around the nature of reality. The Buddhist tradition refuted the substantialist/eternalist viewpoint and dualism or non-dualism, instead positing Śūnyatā (Emptiness) as co-terminous with Pratītyasamutpāda (Interdependent Co-arising). There are many variations of this idea of asmin sati idaṁ bhavati, perhaps the most clear being: “This is, because that is. This is not, because that is not. This comes to be, because that comes to be. This ceases to be, because that ceases to be” (Thich Nhat Hanh, 1999, 221-222). This central teaching of Gautama Buddha was pondered by Nāgārjuna in the MūlaMādhyamakakārikā (The Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way) (Nāgārjuna, 1996). He posited that phenomena do not arise, remain, or cease as intrinsically existent but that all dharmas (or ‘phenomena’) dependently originate upon all other dharmas. Emphasis is on the use of the word intrinsic here – the Sanskrit term svabhāva for something that is deemed to be ‘self-becoming’ or have its ‘own-nature’ (i.e. disconnected and mono-causal). Gangadean defines svabhāva expansively as “the assumption of atomicity” and “static consciousness” and he notes how several formal concepts are associated with it including “atomicity, independence, substance, being, existence, entity” (1979, 42).

According to Nāgārjuna the phenomenal world is ultimately empty (Śūnyatā) of any such things, whether an inherent self or essence or identity – these exist only in a conventional sense as dependently on other phenomena (Pratītyasamutpāda) and our perceptions thereof. This is linked to the doctrine of the Two Truths in Mādhyamaka (not to be confused with dualism), that holds there are the ultimate and the conventional truths. The latter, is the world of empirical appearance, common-sense, and language; the former, of enlightenment and analytical understanding. Without understanding the conventional, the ultimate cannot be understood; and without understanding the significance of the ultimate, liberation from samsāra (the cyclical world of rebirth) cannot be achieved (Nāgārjuna, 1996, 24: 8–10). This way of thinking through ontology, cosmology, and being, is one in which relations and conditions are in view, not nominalism and causation. Powering Nāgārjuna’s refutation of substantialist/eternalist standpoints is an underlying negative dialectical analysis of the concept of Emptiness that he pursued via the question of what there is not, rather than what there is. (Murti 1955, 7-9). I will try to draw out elements of Nāgārjuna’s dialectical method more clearly as it may appear obscure for those in IR.

The sceptical attitude and ‘suspension of judgement’

Mādhyamaka maintains a sceptical attitude to knowledge claims but an open disposition to learning as a dialogical process with the genuine pursuit of truth as its aim. The dialectical method is not about winning an argument but leading to better truth claims about matters that cannot be demonstrated. It has been shown that there was contact and philosophical influence between Greek Pyrrhonian scepticism (defined by its suspension of judgement) and early Buddhism with similarities in their dialectical system and modes of argumentation well-documented (McEvilley, 1982). Both dialectical approaches focus on the terms and tenets used by the interlocutor, so debate is restricted to logical argument by the opponent – this is encapsulated in Nāgārjuna’s notoriously famous but quixotic statement: ‘I do not have any thesis’ [or judgement] (see Neale, 2014, 40). Nāgārjuna claims throughout Vigrahavyāvartani (2005, XVIII) that he does not negate anything (in the sense of cancelling or annulling), for there is nothing to be negated. That is, as all things are empty, there is neither a thing to be negated nor a negation (2005: LXIII).

Whilst some see Nāgārjuna as being arrogant or purely nihilistic here, McEvilley (1982, 17) surmises that the real “purpose and effect” of Nāgārjuna’s dialectic is for the suppression of belief in real (intrinsic or svabhāva) entities or their absence and thus the pacification of conceptual proliferation that causes suffering. It is believed that when we no longer grasp at notions of real or unreal entities – that........

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