Election observation has become a staple of “credibility-assurance” in international relations. Formal poll watching is almost as old as democratic elections themselves. Indeed, some of our less than democratic states meticulously exude a reassuring illusion of transparency, however inevitable the results. Inexperienced volunteers have sometimes been so impressed by the minutiae of election administration and CCTV deployment in countries with a less than democratic reputation that their reports read with deceptive positivity. There was (for example) a brief experimentation with national pilot CCTV observation of Russian elections after 2010, but this did nothing to improve international credibility. Moreover, newcomers oftentimes miscalculate that cameras can also be infringements on democracy.

Election observation has become an integral part of the democratic process, and where it genuinely works, aims to comprehensively evaluate the integrity and fairness of electoral systems. As representative democracy faces increasing scrutiny, election observation has a pivotal role in restoring “voter trust”. The ongoing debates around who observes elections, and their motivations and methodologies, are key features of IR literature. However, recent studies underscore the importance of understanding the varied profiles and catalysts shaping observers, international organizations and monitoring of specific elections or countries. Furthermore, the rise of “fake” election observation missions raises questions about authenticity and effectiveness.

This article does not offer space to elaborate on the specialisms of observer organisations or their prerequisites and training. Likewise, decision-making on specific elections is fraught with complex political considerations. Final decisions may follow from a miscellaneous bundle of diverse cooperations with emerging democracies. Here, we focus primarily on a growing problem in the election observation landscape, namely the rise in organized “fake” election observation. It may appear that use of this pejorative may prejudice particular organisations, well-intended amateurism, or even soft-touch “regional neighbourliness”. There was a time when the likes of the Commonwealth, the Organization of American States (OAS) or AU might have automatically been classified as “less professional” than say the UN, EU, or he Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Increasingly, with common agreements on election law, methodology and training, these impressions are seldom justified.

This article was written in the context of widespread disappointment concerning recent events in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia, which was the subject of a specific European Platform for Democratic Elections (EPDE) report. Not only was the OSCE impeded from organising an Election Observation Mission (EOM) in 2025 due to a combination of late and restricted invitation, but the 2025 Georgian elections........

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