*Originally published in 2025 and preserved as part of our archive project.Get E-International Relations delivered directly to your inbox, free of charge. As you sign up, consider becoming a paid subscriber to support our work.

From its founding in 1948 to its bombardments of Gaza to its new goal of regime change in Iran, Israel has consistently behaved in accordance with the realist paradigm: states are rational actors in an anarchic international system, primarily concerned with their own survival. To survive in the realist paradigm, one must strive to be the most dominant power in the region within which the country is situated. Or, in other words, to become a regional hegemon. In this view, international law, norms, or ethics are subordinate to the pursuit of national interest. Israel’s behaviour — from making and breaking regional alliances to its military operations to its nuclear ambiguity — reveals not recklessness, but realism in its purest form. It is not idealism that guides Jerusalem’s hand, but the hard logic of power, geography, and history. In that sense, Israel is not simply acting rationally in theatres such as Gaza and Iran — it is, in many respects, acting as the most clear-eyed practitioner of realism in the modern era.

Realism begins with an essential insight: the international system lacks a central authority. In this “self-help” environment, every state must prioritize its security, because no one else will. In realist logic, the currency of the international system is power. The ultimate value is survival. Classical realists thus emphasise the primacy of self-interest over moral principle, and regard considerations of justice as inappropriate and, even, dangerous. Surrounded historically by what Israel has perceived to be hostile neighbours, targeted by non-state actors, and subjected to frequent delegitimization campaigns, Israel has long perceived itself as a nation under siege. This perception, far from paranoia, is grounded in history: five major wars, two intifadas, rocket attacks, and a nuclear-aspiring adversary in Iran. Faced with such conditions, Israel has followed the realist script. It invests heavily in military superiority (ensuring deterrence and attempting dominance), cultivates shifting alliances (from France in the 1950s to the United States today), and acts pre-emptively when it feels existentially threatened — as in the 1981 bombing of Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor and, more recently, attacking Iran.

Realists like Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz warn that moral sentiment is often a luxury in global affairs. Interests, not ideals, drive alliances. Israel’s rapprochement with Arab states under the Abraham Accords is a case in point. For decades, the Arab-Israeli conflict was a cornerstone of regional politics. Yet Israel and Gulf monarchies, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia, now find common cause in containing Iranian influence. These ties are not based on shared values — democracy or human rights — but shared threats. Iran’s regional ambitions, coupled with U.S. retrenchment, have pushed old enemies together. Israel’s relations with Russia and China reflect similar calculations. Though these regimes are authoritarian and, at times, antagonistic toward the liberal international order, Israel maintains communication and coordination with both — especially in Syria, where Russian airpower intersects with Israeli operations against Iranian proxies. This is not betrayal of democratic ideals, but adherence to strategic necessity.

Grand strategy is broadly defined as the intellectual architecture that gives form and structure to foreign policy and is the ‘logic that helps states navigate a complex and dangerous world’ (Brands 2014, 1). Grand strategy has been seen ‘as the highest level of foreign policy representing a comprehensive vision of the state’s critical interests and how best to promote and achieve them’ (Apeldoorn 2016, 7). Does Israel have a grand strategy, then? This question continues to befuddle commentators and academics alike. In short, yes it does. And, although it has been adapted to meet the circumstances of the day, it always has been defined clearly and with candour by its leaders. Before the Jewish state was created in 1948, the Zionist grand strategy could be defined as A State at Any Cost. In the early years of the Jewish State, its grand strategy was summed up David Ben Gurion, the........

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