From social protest to the war of narratives -Western propaganda, strategic miscalculation, and the complex reality of Iran-

(Toplumsal protestodan söylem savaşına -Batı propagandası, stratejik yanılgılar ve İran’ın çetrefilli gerçekliği- Hülya Ayhan çevirisiyle)

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In recent weeks and months, Iran has once again returned to the forefront of international media coverage. Yet this return has not been portrayed as that of a complex society with deep internal contradictions, but rather through a simplified, crisis-driven narrative. Social and economic protests that initially emerged amid currency devaluation, rising inflation, and mounting livelihood pressures were rapidly reframed by external media as a “nationwide uprising against the very existence of the system.” The gap between realities inside Iran and the image reproduced abroad has grown so wide that it has itself become a subject requiring independent analysis. The key question remains: why does the West continue to narrate Iran not as it is, but as it wishes it to be?

No fair-minded analysis can deny that Iran’s economy has faced a series of crises in recent years. The persistent decline of the national currency, high inflation, difficulties in importing raw materials, banking restrictions, and sanctions pressure have all profoundly affected the daily lives of millions of Iranians. Merchants struggle with stagnation and price instability, small producers face rising costs and declining consumer purchasing power, and the middle class feels increasingly economically exhausted.

Under such conditions, the emergence of economic and professional protests is neither abnormal nor unexpected. In many countries, such protests constitute a natural mechanism for expressing social dissatisfaction. In their early stages, protests in Iran largely centered on livelihood concerns, criticism of economic policies, and demands for structural reforms. Even many protesters clearly distinguished between criticizing policies and rejecting the country or its sovereignty altogether—a distinction deliberately ignored in much of the external analysis.

However, this situation did not remain unchanged. From January 8 onward, multiple field indicators revealed a shift in street activities in certain areas. The presence of firearms, incendiary materials, targeted attacks on security forces, widespread destruction of public property, and the burning of mosques, religious centers, healthcare facilities, and urban infrastructure cannot be reconciled with any recognized definition of civil or professional protest.

Historically, even during periods of intense unrest, Iranian society has observed specific unwritten “red lines,” including refraining from damaging sacred sites, medical services, and the lives of ordinary citizens. The crossing of these lines was a clear sign that part of the scene had moved beyond the control of ordinary protesters and fallen into the hands of groups seeking escalation and instability rather than reform.

The nature of the violence employed—particularly in certain killings and organized attacks—bore troubling similarities to the tactics of terrorist organizations. Such patterns aim not at expressing demands but at producing casualties, provoking harsh responses, and pushing society toward uncontrolled chaos. In security studies, these methods are widely recognized as tools of asymmetric warfare.

The arrest of several field operatives and the release of preliminary information regarding links between some of them and networks affiliated with Mossad, the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization, monarchist currents, and separatist groups offered a more complex picture of the unrest. The presence of separatist elements - particularly in border regions- suggests that the objectives of certain external and proxy actors went beyond political or media pressure. Instead, weakening national cohesion and paving the way for more dangerous scenarios, including the fragmentation of Iran, appeared to be part of the agenda.

For Iranian society, this constitutes a fundamental red line. Historical experience shows that Iranians, regardless of political differences, are deeply sensitive to territorial integrity and national unity. Any sign of separatism or foreign intervention rapidly generates broad negative reactions across social strata, reactions that many external planners failed to anticipate.

The Iranian government’s decision to restrict internet access was aimed at disrupting coordination among violent networks and preventing further escalation. However, it simultaneously created a serious information vacuum. Foreign media outlets and social networks quickly filled this vacuum with one-sided narratives and unverifiable statistics.

In this environment, contradictory and highly exaggerated casualty figures circulated, ranging from 6,000 to 12,000 and even 20,000 deaths. Such figures not only failed to align with field evidence but were also historically implausible. Even during the eight-year Iran–Iraq war - an all-out military conflict- such numbers were not reported within such short timeframes. This statistical exaggeration was less a professional error than part of a psychological strategy aimed at creating shock, mobilizing global opinion, and legitimizing political and economic pressure against Iran.

One of the greatest weaknesses in Western analyses lies in their failure to grasp the political psychology of Iranian society. Iran is a pluralistic, critical society marked by internal tensions. Dissatisfaction, protest, and even social anger are real and visible. Yet historical experience demonstrates that when national interests, territorial integrity, or external threats are at stake, internal divisions significantly diminish.

At such moments, opponents and supporters, religious and secular citizens, critics and loyalists often stand on the same........

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