“Sixty years with an unjust imam is better than one night without a sultan,” Ibn Taymiyya wrote in the early 14th century, during the height of the Mongol invasions. He commented on the experience of earlier Sunni scholars, who emphasized that even under an unjust ruler, maintaining order and the functioning of society was paramount; as they expressed, “If only one of our prayers can be answered, let it be for the sultan.” These ideas later underpinned the Sunni principle of siyāsa al-sharʿiyya — the use of governance and authority to preserve social and religious order.

Today, this principle is actively realized in the Gulf monarchies. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other regional states demonstrate that the logic of stability and national interest outweigh doctrinal or ideological imperatives: religious institutions remain visible, but practical decisions are made pragmatically. This extends across a spectrum of policies — from historical precedents like the Treaty of Hudaybiyya, to contemporary Saudi-Iranian dialogue, cautious engagement with Israel without formal normalization, Riyadh’s pragmatic relations with China, and the abandonment of ideological export — all within the framework of Islamic legitimacy. In this sense, Gulf strategies represent an Islamic version of raison d’état (the European concept associated with Machiavelli), where stability supersedes ideology.

Even amid “liberalization,” religion and tradition remain subordinated to governance, while adaptive practices, once obscured by rigid interpretations of Sharia, are increasingly reintegrated into statecraft. The Arab Spring revealed the limits of rigid Islamism and accelerated the return of these flexible strategies through modernization, legal reform, and conflict management — showing how historical Sunni governance principles continue to shape practical statecraft.

For Western analysts, even those versed in Middle Eastern politics, Gulf modernization, liberalization, and apparent secularization often signal a departure from religion. Yet within the Islamic intellectual tradition, what is unfolding is different: a shift from literalist normative readings of Sharia toward a state-oriented fiqh — a return, in many ways, to pre-colonial political thought. Understanding this internal logic is crucial for interpreting Gulf states’ strategies, both in external diplomacy and in balancing legitimacy with societal expectations at home.

Historical Framework: From Legal Ideal to Statecraft

The principle later articulated through siyāsa al-sharʿiyya did not emerge as abstract theology but as a response to political crisis. Within the Hanbalite intellectual milieu — closely intertwined with periods of fragmented authority and unstable rule — jurists confronted a practical question: how can an Islamic society be preserved when ideal legal conditions no longer exist?

In this context, Ibn Taymiyya systematized governance as a legal instrument. Episodes such as the Treaty of Hudaybiyya or the policies of Caliph ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb — including the suspension of theft punishments during famine and administrative decisions regarding conquered lands — were retrospectively understood as precedents of pragmatic governance aligned with public welfare rather than strict textualism. Over time, broader Sunni scholarship developed these ideas: Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī reflected systematically on public welfare, while Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī formulated maqāṣid al-sharīʿa,........

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