Concerns over a potential Taiwan contingency have steadily intensified since 2021, the year former U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Commander Adm. Philip Davidson warned that China could acquire the capability to invade Taiwan by 2027. That concern has been reinforced by Beijing’s mounting military pressure on the island. Yet comparatively little attention has been paid to a critical backdrop: China’s rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal.

The U.S. Department of Defense assesses that China could possess more than 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030. It is modernizing its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), including MIRV-capable DF-41s and a possible successor, the DF-61; constructing large numbers of missile silos; and developing hypersonic delivery systems to enhance survivability and penetrative capability. Even so, it remains unclear how Beijing intends to position and potentially employ its nuclear forces in a Taiwan crisis.

For Japan — likely to be directly affected by any Taiwan contingency — this question is not abstract. As a nonnuclear state, Japan’s options for responding to Chinese nuclear coercion are inherently constrained. Although many experts acknowledge the need for more serious debate on nuclear issues, discussion has rarely advanced in concrete military terms. The first step toward such a debate should be to address the analytical foundations, as outlined below.

© The Japan Times