Trans-Pacific View | Diplomacy | Oceania

To Compete in the Pacific, the US Needs to Move Past Zero-Sum Alignment 

The U.S. wants explicit alignment, but China’s more flexible approach to strategic competition resonates with Pacific Island states.

Then-U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken meets with President of the Republic of the Marshall Islands David Kabua, President of the Federated States of Micronesia David Panuelo, and President of Palau Surangel Whipps Jr. at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C., Sep. 29, 2022.

China-U.S. strategic competition has become the defining feature of 21st century international relations. How each power conceptualizes and prosecutes this rivalry, however, varies considerably, and those differences carry significant strategic consequences. American policymakers have generally approached competition through a framework that prizes clear alignment, incentivizing partner states to demonstrate commitment to the U.S.-led order. Beijing, by contrast, operates with a considerably lower threshold: it does not require explicit alignment, only that states refrain from actively undermining Chinese interests.  Of course, Beijing is willing to reward those who will actively support its positions. 

This asymmetry in approach matters. In the Pacific Islands, where strategic imperatives of sovereignty, development, and non-alignment shape foreign policy choices, Washington’s framework creates friction that Beijing’s more flexible posture does not. Bridging this gap between how the United States frames strategic competition and the realities in which Pacific Island states operate is essential to advancing American interests in the region. Understanding how Beijing exploits this space is the first step toward closing it.

Beijing’s engagement in the Pacific is not premised on winning formal alliances, but on making non-alignment with the United States the path of least resistance. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, bilateral aid packages, and security agreements deliberately framed around sovereignty and non-interference, Beijing offers Pacific Island states tangible benefits without demanding ideological commitment in return. Beijing has been explicit about this posture, formally committing to “no political strings attached” to its assistance and pledging full respect for Pacific Island sovereignty. 

China’s 2022 security agreement with Solomon Islands exemplifies this logic in practice. Honiara secured infrastructure investment, police training, and diplomatic leverage over its traditional partners, all without formally aligning against the United States. While the consequences included considerable domestic and international political frictions, which contributed to Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare’s electoral ouster in 2024, many Pacific governments will see the allure of Beijing’s model. 

Indeed, Pacific Island states have increasingly used this competitive dynamic to their advantage, extracting concessions from both Washington and Beijing while resisting pressure to commit to either. China’s low threshold makes these hedging efforts far easier to sustain, gradually eroding the strategic access and influence the United States depends upon in the region.

The U.S. and Allied Approach

Meanwhile efforts by the United States and its allies to gain ground in the Pacific Islands have centered on developing multilateral frameworks, which require as a first step obtaining commitments from foreign governments declaring that they are “all in.” Perhaps the most glaring example was the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) where countries were asked to sign up before the substantive details were even composed. That 13 countries did sign up, without knowing what they would receive in return, is a strong signal of the extant demand for U.S. leadership and engagement.

As another example, the Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP) on its face was an effort to align foreign assistance from external partners with the endogenously identified development priorities Pacific Islands Forum members codified in the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. In function, the PBP was a signaling mechanism for external donors to align with U.S.-led attempts to counter what Washington saw as “covert, coercive, and corrupting” influence from Beijing. In fact, both IPEF and the PBP, and some would argue the entire “Pivot” to the Asia-Pacific, were widely seen as signs of U.S. alarm about the rise of China rather than genuine interest in the........

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