The Pulse | Diplomacy | South Asia

Pakistan, the Islamabad MoU, and the Limits of Middle Power Diplomacy

Unless the diplomatic momentum abroad translates into economic improvement at home, its impact will be limited.

For a brief, surreal moment this June, the world’s geopolitical axis pivoted to Islamabad, a capital usually associated with IMF bailouts, rolling blackouts, and chronic internal instability. The signing of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on June 17, establishing a 60-day roadmap to provide a framework for ending the catastrophic Iran-U.S. war and reopening the blocked Strait of Hormuz, presents a striking paradox.

Pakistan, though facing serious economic challenges, has successfully mediated a peace framework between the world’s biggest superpower and its most defiant regional adversary.

This historic breakthrough was achieved through relentless shuttle diplomacy. Driven by the unlikely double act of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan managed a delicate diplomatic balancing act. It successfully brought U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to the negotiating table; kept suspicious Gulf monarchies, especially Saudi Arabia, with which it has a Strategic Mutual Defense pact, aligned; and assumed a key role as the intermediary everyone is willing to talk to.

While Pakistan has showed it can bring opposing sides to the table and make itself diplomatically relevant, its economy is weak. That leaves its foreign policy with little room to maneuver. The real test, then, is whether Islamabad can turn this diplomatic momentum into economic gains that will strengthen its position on the international stage over the long run.

Pakistan did not set out to become a go-between. The opportunity was the product of events in the region that left very few alternatives. By the end of 2025, U.S. relations with Iran had become increasingly fraught. At the same time, many of the usual diplomatic contacts were no longer working. Pakistan, however, still had working relationships with the main regional players. That put Islamabad in a position to help reopen conversations that others were struggling to start.

Relying on long-established military and diplomatic contacts, Pakistan became one of the few countries still able to talk across the divide. Much of the effort was kept out of public view. Munir is understood to have driven the initiative, while Sharif’s government handled the civilian diplomacy.

Just as important was the decision not to treat the crisis as a purely American-Iranian dispute. Pakistan understood that any breakthrough would unsettle Gulf capitals if they were left on the sidelines. Pakistan coordinated closely with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf partners throughout the process. According to Pakistani officials and diplomatic sources, this helped turn the focus away from the immediate confrontation and toward a wider regional interest: keeping the Strait of Hormuz open and avoiding another disruption to global energy markets.

When Vance publicly thanked Pakistan for its role in the negotiations, it was clear something had changed. For years, Pakistan had been viewed in Washington largely through the lens of counterterrorism. This time, it was being recognized for something different: its diplomatic acumen.

This emerging diplomatic centrality is even more remarkable when contrasted against Pakistan’s historically complicated relationships with both Washington and Tehran.

Pakistan and Iran have spent surprisingly little time on the same page. Their common 900-kilometer border has more often been a source of tension than cooperation. Pakistan was quick to........

© The Diplomat