In mid-November 2025, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani arrived in Beijing for his first official visit since the fall of Bashar al-Assad. A joint statement after the visit reaffirmed respect for sovereignty, non-interference, and counterterrorism cooperation, while gesturing toward possible collaboration on reconstruction and development. For a country emerging from years of war, sanctions, and diplomatic isolation, the visit appeared to signal a tentative diplomatic reset with a major power that had long shielded Damascus at the United Nations and avoided Western-style political conditionality.

Yet the substance of the visit told a more cautious story. What was concrete in Beijing centered overwhelmingly on security: counterterrorism cooperation, assurances that Syrian territory would not threaten Chinese interests, and reaffirmation of the One China principle. Economic cooperation, by contrast, remained aspirational. References to reconstruction were framed as areas to be “explored,” without timelines, financing mechanisms, or flagship projects. While Damascus sought to project momentum, Beijing avoided commitments that would bind it too closely to Syria’s fragile transition.

This imbalance captures the core of China’s approach to post-Assad Syria. Beijing is engaging, but through a strategy of risk management rather than reconstruction leadership. The objective is to contain potential threats, preserve diplomatic leverage, and retain flexibility, not to underwrite Syria’s recovery or replace Western and Gulf capital. Syria is treated less as an arena for expansion than as a file to be handled carefully, with security concerns setting clear limits on cooperation.

Three priorities shape this posture. First, security: the presence of foreign fighters, particularly Uyghur-linked networks associated with the Turkistan Islamic Party, dominates Beijing’s assessments and its messaging at both bilateral and U.N. levels. Second, diplomacy: China anchors engagement in sovereignty, non-interference, and a “Syrian-led and Syrian-owned” political process, avoiding overt alignment with any bloc. Third, economics: Beijing is keeping options open through limited trade and exploratory agreements, while steering clear of major reconstruction commitments amid sanctions risk, governance uncertainty, and unresolved political tensions.

Security First: Foreign Fighters and China’s Red Lines

For Beijing, Syria’s post-Assad transition is first and foremost a counterterrorism problem. Long before reconstruction or investment enters the conversation, Chinese officials have made clear that the presence of foreign fighters, particularly those linked to Uyghur militant networks, defines the outer boundary of engagement. This emphasis surfaced repeatedly during al-Shaibani’s visit to Beijing, where counterterrorism cooperation dominated both the joint statement and public messaging. 

China’s focus is concrete rather than rhetorical. Thousands of Uyghur fighters associated with the Turkistan Islamic Party remain active in Syria, many concentrated in the northwest and........

© The Diplomat