The practice is not consistent.

Josh Blackman | 12.19.2025 12:09 PM

On October 7, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Chiles v. Salazar. This case will decide the constitutionality of Colorado's ban on conversion therapy. A decision in that case is expected at some point by the end of June.

As the Supreme Court deliberates on this issue, conversion therapy laws are still on the books in other states. For example, Catholic Charities of Jackson v. Whitmer presents a challenge to Michigan's ban on conversion therapy. The District Court upheld the law, and an appeal was docketed at the Sixth Circuit in February 2025. The Supreme Court granted cert in Chiles on March 10, 2025. In a joint motion, the Defendants asked the Sixth Circuit to put the case on hold, while the Plaintiffs asked the Sixth Circuit to move forward in the ordinary course.

The case was argued before the Sixth Circuit on October 23, about two weeks after the Supreme Court heard argument in Chiles. And two days ago, on December 17, a divided panel of Sixth Circuit found the conversion therapy law was unconstitutional. Judge Kethledge wrote the majority opinion, which Judge Larsen joined. Judge Bloomekatz dissented. I will put aside the merits for now.

Judge Kethledge explained why the majority was deciding the case, even as Chiles was pending. He frames his decision in terms of the federal court's unflagging duty to exercise jurisdiction:

The defendants also argue that we should forbear from deciding this appeal and instead simply await the Supreme Court's decision in a pending case that presents the same issue as the one here. But the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that "a federal court's obligation to hear and decide cases within its jurisdiction is virtually unflagging."

Moreover, this case involves a request for a preliminary injunction, which is time sensitive:

And orders granting or denying a preliminary injunction are by definition time-sensitive. Their effect is immediate, because they set the status quo during the case's pendency—only to be superseded months or years later by the court's final judgment. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court's decision could come as late as the end of June 2026; and the plaintiffs make a strong claim that the status quo here—they wish to speak in a certain way, but cannot—violates the federal Constitution.

Finally, Judge Kethledge suggests his opinion might actually help the Supreme Court's deliberations:

Nor would our decision intrude in the slightest upon the Supreme Court's work; to the contrary, the Court prefers to have more circuit-court opinions before deciding an issue, rather than fewer. We see no reason to sit on our jurisdiction in this appeal—so we proceed to exercise it.

Judge Bloomekatz's dissent addressed the abeyance in........

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