The call issued by Bob Carr and Gareth Evans for a ‘comprehensive détente between the US and China is timely and constructive. But as with all things to do with peace and war, the issues are complex and the way forward strewn with difficulties.

China-US tensions are indeed a matter of deep concern. They can easily escalate, whether by design, accident or miscalculation, into destructive regional conflict and even global conflagration.

That the strained bilateral relationship has somewhat eased in recent months is a welcome development. The reopening of communication channels, establishment of working groups, and modest progress on contentious trade issues have raised hopes of better days. These are the promising signs which Carr and Evans have seized on to make the case for comprehensive détente.

The case, however, raises several unavoidable questions. Is the rather modest easing of tensions of recent months more than temporary tactical manoeuvring by each side? What exactly is comprehensive détente? Does it offer an adequate and durable response to the geopolitical faultlines of our times?

The Carr and Evans proposal is patterned in part on two periods of détente that punctuated the Cold War years, the first from the late 1960s to late 1970s, and the second from 1984 to 1990. It is unlikely, however, that either period can be replicated, or that either provides a model worth replicating.

In each case, the two sides reached a number of agreements, but it is doubtful whether either, and in particular the United States, saw détente as the end game.

In the 1970s, détente yielded the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty of 1972 and the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe leading to the so-called Helsinki accords in 1975. But both sides continued to jostle for advantage whenever and wherever they could.

The United States in particular was still intent on the global projection of military power, and to this end engaged in an........

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