On October 8, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gave the Lebanese a stark choice: rise up against Hezbollah or risk turning into Gaza. “Stand up and take your country,” he said, “before it falls into the abyss of a long war that will lead to destruction and suffering like we see in Gaza.”

Shortly before Netanyahu spoke, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had visited Lebanon in an effort to shore up Hezbollah’s morale. In the week since Israel began its full assault in late September, the group’s leadership and rank and file had been decimated by successive military operations. Thousands of Lebanese had been killed or injured and more than a million had been displaced by Israel’s heavy bombardment, including in Beirut itself, and the country’s politicians were pushing for a ceasefire. But Araghchi’s visit seemed to have scuttled those efforts. A few weeks later, Iran’s speaker of Parliament, Mohammad Galibaf, declared in an interview with the French press that Iran would negotiate with France on behalf of Lebanon for a cease-fire. Hezbollah is Iran’s protégé, and it is the most powerful actor within Lebanon—more powerful than Lebanon’s own armed forces. Both Araghchi and Qalibaf made clear that the fighting would not end until Iran said so.

Netanyahu’s speech and Araghchi’s visit highlighted just how much Lebanon had become the center of the proxy war between Iran and Israel. It is the place where the two countries are most outwardly tussling over the Middle East’s regional order. The country’s role in their fight has, accordingly, received substantial international attention.

But overlooked is the effect that this conflict will have on the future of Lebanon itself. The war has come to the country at perhaps the worst possible moment. Lebanon is experiencing a political deadlock that has prevented the election of a new president. Its internal security forces are now so weak that communities and people have turned to private self-protection services, often affiliated with key political parties. The state is still dealing with the aftermath of the 2020 Beirut port explosion, considered by international organizations—including Human Rights Watch—to be one of the most powerful nonnuclear explosions of all time. And the country is in the midst of a five-year economic and financial crisis that has wiped out its middle class and sent poverty rates skyrocketing, from 12 percent in 2012 to 44 percent in 2022 (the most recent year for which there is data).

Critically, the power-sharing system through which Lebanon is governed means that the state is also highly fractured along sectarian lines, with political parties representing different communities. The fighting with Israel is worsening these divisions. The massive destruction and suffering could, in time, turn the country’s Sunni and Christian populations against its Shiite Muslims, who make up about a third of the population and are Hezbollah’s base of support. It is also unsettling Lebanon’s domestic political balance. Lebanese people and parties that have long resented Hezbollah’s hegemony are sensing a unique opportunity to reshape Lebanon’s political dynamics more in their favor.

For Lebanon, this makes for a dangerous moment. The country’s factions have a history of settling their differences through violence, as the terrible 15-year Lebanese civil war attests. But the country can avoid a new outburst of civil unrest if its factions, Hezbollah included, initiate a national dialogue that advances a path forward and an inclusive vision for the country. If nothing else, these groups should all share an interest in stabilizing their country’s institutions. And they need support from the international community—in part to stop Israel’s brutal attacks.

Israel and Hezbollah have been fighting since October 2023, when Hezbollah attacked the country in support of Gaza (as did other groups aligned with Hamas). But for most of the last year, these skirmishes were limited, consisting mostly of targeted assassinations by Israel of Hezbollah members and aerial bombardments of the group’s weapons depots and other Hezbollah-affiliated positions. Hezbollah, in turn, lobbed missiles across Israel’s border with Lebanon. Around 430 members of Hezbollah were killed during this period along with scores of ordinary Lebanese civilians, including three journalists. Some 60,000 residents of northern Israel were forced to flee the area. In Lebanon, around 90,000 residents fled Israeli bombardments of towns and villages.

But after 11 months, the fighting transformed into an all-out war, as Hezbollah’s bet on maintaining a limited conflict failed. The switch happened quickly, with a shocking series of operations on September 17 that culminated in the assassination of Hezbollah’s senior military leadership, followed by the September 27 killing of the group’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah. (Days later, Israel also killed his presumed successor, Hashem Safieddine.) Israel launched a mass campaign of countrywide aerial bombardments. It moved soldiers to its north. And on October 1, it........

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