The Kremlin is on a roll in large parts of Africa. In April, the Pentagon announced withdrawals of U.S. military forces from Chad and Niger, two key U.S. partners in counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel that are now turning to Russia for security assistance. In the case of Niger, a military junta that seized power in a coup last year ordered U.S. personnel to leave a $100 million drone base. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has been pouring mercenaries, proxies, and materiel into Libya for the past six months, adding to its already sizable presence in that country. Libya is now an important access point for Russia in the Mediterranean and a launching pad for operations elsewhere in Africa.

A string of coups across Africa since 2020 has allowed Moscow to strengthen its position on the continent, even as it funnels vast military and economic resources into the war in Ukraine. Russia’s increased military, political, and economic presence in a diverse array of countries that now includes Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan also flies in the face of expectations expressed by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who said in June 2023 that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine had “diminished Russian influence on every continent.” More than two years into that war, Russia clearly remains capable of seizing opportunities to expand its reach in Africa and other parts of the world.

With so many other crises calling for the Biden administration’s attention, rolling back Russia’s advances in Africa will not be easy, not least because the Kremlin has ingratiated itself with many unsavory regimes there. Moreover, Russia’s recent successes capitalize on a combination of worsening regional security dynamics and the continent’s postcolonial history. In the Sahel, for example, Russia touts its ability to help governments respond to rising violence and jihadist threats while scorning France, the former colonial power, for its long record of heavy-handedness and failed policies.

The key question for the United States is how to identify realistic policy goals that play to Washington’s strengths, align with U.S. values, and harness Africa’s enormous potential while recognizing that many countries want to hedge their bets when it comes to foreign partners. Democratic and Republican administrations alike have often treated countering Russia as an end in itself, citing the demands of great-power competition as justification for action in every country where Moscow gains a foothold. U.S. policymakers should take a more selective approach. Instead of simply........

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