The question of the United States’ military aircraft getting unrestricted access over Indonesian airspace has once again surfaced as a test of the country’s longstanding commitment to strategic autonomy. While permission for occasional overflights may seem a matter of marginal importance to some, in fact, granting unlimited passage would compromise Indonesia’s national sovereignty and complicate a nonaligned foreign and security policy. With tensions running high in the Indo-Pacific, such seemingly technical aviation requests are increasingly anything but. They amount, in fact, to a broad test of Indonesia’s post-independence strategic choices and its credibility as a neutral actor in a region steadily becoming more bipolar.

Indonesia is notoriously sensitive to the presence of foreign military units or assets on its territory. Ever since independence was finally achieved in 1945, Jakarta has managed to avoid permitting foreign forces to establish any sort of permanent basing rights or even long-term transit corridors. This policy has significant implications, and Indonesia is not inclined to permit unrestricted access to its airspace, facilities for in-transit refuelling, or other forms of support that would create a standing exemption to a case-by-case assessment of cooperation initiatives. The US military’s experience with its 2000s efforts to negotiate increased access to Indonesian airspace for its airlift fleet provides a salutary lesson in this regard, as does the current cooperative framework embodied in exercises like Garuda Shield and activities about maritime domain awareness.

Washington has its own set of calculations as it seeks to operationalise the Indo-Pacific, requiring strategic air corridors and passageways across the Indo-Pacific Region. For Jakarta, the calculation is far more complex. While it may gain from enhanced cooperation in defence with Washington, it cannot risk jeopardising the stability of its relationships with China, its largest trading partner, and a country investing significantly in Indonesian infrastructure, energy, and strategic locations. The calculus here is delicate: how to strengthen defence cooperation with Washington without being seen as siding with the U.S. against China?

There are also numerous potential problems with “unrestricted access”. The permission of foreigners to overfly Indonesia (or land and remain for any duration) would be perceived to be an affront to Indonesian sovereignty, and very likely offend certain elements of the Indonesian society and politics, with various politicians vying for supremacy in standing up to foreigners. The perception that any foreign military, especially those with poor human rights records such as the US, would be granted privileged passage through Indonesian airspace would undoubtedly be very quickly picked up by the Chinese government and used in some way as part of the ongoing chess game with respect to the Natuna Islands. There are also strong concerns within the TNI that they would lose too much control over any foreign presence in the archipelago. Finally, granting privileged airspace over to foreign powers would almost certainly cause considerable ire in other parts of the region and could lead to concerns that Indonesia is shifting towards an overly close alliance with the USA in contradiction to the “ASEAN Way” and potentially even affect Indonesia’s participation in future ASEAN initiatives.

However, these domestic considerations are set against a backdrop of increasing geopolitical tension in the Indo-Pacific as Washington and Beijing battle for logistical and military advantages. Indonesia will be under great pressure to facilitate the USAF’s needs for its airman to qualify on the C-130J. The Indonesian government must be vigilant to avoid its skies and airspace being drawn into this increasingly hard competition between major world powers. Moreover, any attempts to open the air force to greater foreign military co-operation will have to withstand deep-seated public unease over allowing foreign troops to be stationed in Indonesia. The leaders in Jakarta will also be constrained by a requirement to project an image of independence and even nationalism to their electorate, as well as the constant spectre of parliamentary questioning and criticism.

While rejecting any unconditional access of the US military here could be taken as unacceptable invariance and obstinacy, there are many options in between; e.g., continuing to scrutinise every request on a case-by-case basis, maintaining full transparency while strictly ensuring that cooperation here is in line with national interests. In fact, there are at least four options in between: allowing limited access on strictly conditional terms, for instance for humanitarian reasons, disaster relief, joint training other purposes deemed strategic and mutually beneficial; placing any military access within a multilateral mechanism and process, within the framework of ASEAN or other regional cooperation formats, so that US military deployment here does not only remain limited but also does not pose any bilateral pressure; further solidifying cooperation and mutually beneficial relations in security affairs with other countries including those from outside the region; continuing to strengthen this country’s air defines and surveillance systems, so that it does not have to rely excessively on its neighbour to the north.

The ability of U.S. military aircraft to gain unrestricted access to the skies of Indonesia is not an ordinary defence cooperation arrangement; it is a crossroads of strategic significance for Indonesia. It must not compromise its national sovereignty and non-aligned foreign policy stance and risk being drawn into another great power rivalry. While Indonesia’s future air forces may benefit from civilian and military U.S. training and technology, they should not also facilitate unrestricted unilateral U.S. combat air operations from Indonesian airspace without careful consideration of potential implications. In an increasingly competitive Indo-Pacific, how Indonesia chooses to manage its strategic autonomy will determine whether control of its skies remains vital to its national interests or is ceded to external powers.

Simon Hutagalung is a retired Indonesian Foreign Ministry official. The opinions expressed in this article are his own.

Indonesia Défense Ministry. (2026, April 13). Indonesia dismisses claims of U.S. access to national airspace. ANTARA News. https://en.antaranews.com/news/412053/indonesia-dismisses-claims-of-us-access-to-national-airspace

Chappy Hakim. (2023). State sovereignty in the air as a pillar of independence. Chappy Hakim Official Website. https://www.chappyhakim.com/state-sovereignty-in-the-air-as-a-pillar-of-independence/

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