Writing after what he dates as the 18th BRICS summit in New Delhi (23–24 September 2026), Simon Hutagalung argues that India, not China, supplied the political glue: consensus across a more diverse membership and “strategic autonomy,” while China’s weight stays economic (BRI, size). He treats that as a shift from a China-centred trade club to an India-led political forum for the Global South.

He says fears of an explicit anti-Western bloc were misplaced. The Delhi Declaration criticizes unilateral economic measures and wants financial-architecture reform but stays cooperative rather than confrontational. Local-currency settlement and AI/digital programs for developing countries are listed as India’s practical offers.

BRICS is still described as a loose club: declarations matter only if they become UN/IMF reform, stabler finance, and fairer tech. Until then, potential exceeds delivery. Leadership of the South, in this telling, now sits 

On 23-24 September 2026, the 18th BRICS Summit took place in New Delhi. The world is experiencing an increase in rivalry between major powers, ongoing conflict in Europe, increasing tension in the Middle East, greater dissatisfaction among countries of the world with the current international institutions, and the growing BRICS.

For the first time in its history, BRICS is going to enter the third decade of its existence, and accordingly the main question that would be relevant for it would not be whether it is needed or not but who will shape its future. Though China’s economic presence in BRICS is unmatched, at the New Delhi Summit, India successfully managed its internal differences, championed strategic autonomy, and secured consensus of all members, including the diverse lot. Thus, even in BRICS, political leadership to manage the organization is not synonymous with economic power and China’s economic clout. India’s leadership has ushered in a new era when BRICS would transmute from........

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