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Elections are the foundational act of a parliamentary democracy. They are not routine administrative exercises but the solemn constitutional ritual by which sovereignty returns to the people and is consciously re-delegated to their representatives. If democracy is the heart of the Republic, elections are its living pulse.

Article 324 of the constitution vests in a single authority – the Election Commission of India (ECI) – the superintendence, direction and control of elections to parliament and to every State Legislature. Over the decades, the ECI built a formidable reputation, conducting elections on a scale unparalleled in human history and often under demanding conditions.  Yet in recent years it has increasingly found itself at the centre of political and legal controversy (see final section: Six recent controversies surrounding the ECI).

Whether each criticism is ultimately justified or not, the cumulative effect reveals a serious structural concern: when one institution conducts all elections across a vast federation, every controversy – administrative, procedural or even perceptual – assumes national significance and reverberates across the entire democratic system.

Comparative federal practice

A comparative analysis of major federal democracies reveals that India’s centralised model is an outlier.

In Canada, Elections Canada conducts federal elections, while provincial elections are administered by wholly independent provincial bodies such as Elections Ontario, Elections Quebec, etc., with no federal oversight.

In Australia, the Australian Electoral Commission manages federal polls, but state (province-level) elections are conducted exclusively by state electoral commissions, even though a common electoral roll is shared for efficiency.

In the United States, elections – including presidential elections – are run entirely by individual states and local authorities, with no national election machinery. The Federal Election Commission regulates campaign finance but conducts no elections.

In Switzerland, cantons administer all elections, while the Federal Chancellery coordinates election management and communication, collects, compiles and publishes the final election results.

India’s centralised electoral architecture reveals three inherent structural vulnerabilities. First, an institution appointed predominantly by the Union government of the day is required to act as neutral arbiter in contests that determine the same government’s own political future. Second, when the Election Commission is constituted entirely through Union-level processes, the Union executive acquires disproportionate influence – indirectly yet materially – over state elections. Third, the system creates a risk of single-point-of-failure: any erosion in neutrality, credibility or administrative competence of the single central authority affects elections across the entire country simultaneously.

These anxieties are not new. They were voiced in the Constituent Assembly in June 1949, when several members cautioned against excessive centralisation of electoral authority. The issue, therefore, is not one of personalities but of design.

The Constituent Assembly debates

During the debates on Draft Article 289 (now Article 324), the chairman of the drafting committee of the constitution, Dr B.R. Ambedkar, candidly admitted that ensuring the Election Commission’s independence “is going to give this house a great deal of headache”. He conceded that there was nothing “to provide against nomination of an unfit person to the post of the Chief Election Commissioner or the other Election Commissioners” and also that there was “no provision in the Constitution to prevent either a fool or a knave or a person who is likely to be under the thumb of the Executive”.

Shibban Lal Saksena, representing the United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh) in the Assembly, argued that “it is quite possible that some party in power who wants to win the next election may appoint a staunch party-man as the Chief Election Commissioner”. He proposed that the appointments to the Election Commission should be subject to confirmation by a two-thirds majority of both houses of parliament in a joint session.

Several members opposed the centralisation of the election process. Member Hridaynath Kunzru observed:

I do not know of any federal Constitution in which the Centre is charged with the duty of getting the electoral rolls prepared and the elections held fairly and without prejudice to any minority … Is there no danger … that the political prejudices of the Central Government may prevail where otherwise the political prejudices of the provincial Governments might have prevailed?

Kunzru, a moderate liberal voice in the Assembly, also famously warned: “If the electoral machinery is defective or is not efficient or is worked by people whose integrity cannot be depended upon, democracy will be poisoned at the source.”

Annie Mascarene, from Travancore (now Kerala) remarked:

Sir, I am a believer in the right of the people of the province to elect their representatives independent of any control, supervision and direction of any power on earth … From this article it looks as if the Centre is assuming to be the custodian of justice … If this section is to be accepted, we are to believe that thereafter the provincial election will be under the perpetual tutelage of the Centre. That means, Sir, that the integrity of the provincial people is questioned.

Assam Congress leader and Constituent Assembly member Kuladhar Chaliha said during the debates, “If we cannot trust our own people, we are not worthy of our independence. Sir, an injustice is sought to be done to the provinces and they are needlessly suspected … ”

Despite these apprehensions, the Constituent Assembly adopted Draft Article 289 (now Article 324) in its present form, incorporating what was intended as a “safety clause” in Article 324(2). This provision stipulated that appointments to the ECI would be “subject to the provisions of any law made in that behalf by Parliament”. Yet, for more than seventy-three years, Parliament did not enact such a law.

In Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023), the Supreme Court intervened to safeguard institutional neutrality, directing that appointments be made by a selection........

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