Last week, Prince William stood beside Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the At-Turaif UNESCO World Heritage Site in Riyadh—two future kings, one aged 43, the other 40, who will in all probability reign in tandem for decades. The visit, requested by the British government to coincide with the World Defense Show, was not mere ceremony. Britain is courting Saudi participation in the Global Combat Air Program’s sixth-generation Tempest fighter, a partnership that could help share the estimated $76 billion development cost while advancing Vision 2030’s defense industrialization ambitions. The UK’s Trade Minister declared the GCC free trade agreement “97.5 per cent done.”

Against this backdrop, Dr David Owen, former Plymouth MP and retired member of the House of Lords, recently declared that he has never, in his 87 years as a Plymothian, seen so bright a future for his city. With UK defense spending set to rise from 2.3 per cent of GDP to 2.5 per cent by 2027—and the Starmer government reportedly considering accelerating the 3 per cent target to 2029—Plymouth’s Devonport Dockyard stands at the epicenter of Britain’s defense industrial renaissance.

But Owen’s vision misses half the strategic picture. If Britain is serious about translating rising defense budgets into lasting geopolitical influence, the road from Devonport must run through the Middle East.

The Plymouth Dividend

Owen is right that Babcock International is extraordinarily well-positioned. Devonport is the UK’s sole licensed site for refitting nuclear-powered submarines, and Babcock has recently commenced a multi-year, multi-billion-pound infrastructure regeneration program to support the Astute-class fleet. With a 70-year pipeline of work, over 6,300 direct employees, and more than 100 new apprentices recruited each year, the economic multiplier for Plymouth is substantial. Chancellor Rachel Reeves highlighted Plymouth alongside Portsmouth and Barrow-in-Furness as priority investment clusters in the 2025 Budget. At Rosyth, Babcock floated off HMS Venturer—the first of five Type 31 Inspiration-class frigates—in June 2025. These vessels were designed with international sales in mind. Indonesia has signed for Arrowhead-140 variants, Poland has ordered three, and Gulf navies seeking affordable surface combatants represent a natural export market. Owen’s call for “new defense jobs and lasting investment” is sound industrial strategy—with a global export dimension he does not mention.

From Devonport to Duqm

What any serious analyst of Britain’s defense posture must reckon with is that Babcock already has a significant operational footprint in the Gulf. Since 2016, Babcock has operated the Duqm Naval Dockyard in Oman through a joint venture, strategically located outside the Straits of Hormuz. The facility has completed complex warship maintenance for both the Royal Navy and the US Military Sealift Command, including a first-of-its-kind double engine replacement for HMS Montrose. The UK’s Joint Logistics Support Base at Duqm validates the concept of a forward-deployed engineering hub that extends Royal Navy reach without the expense of large permanent garrisons.

The June 2025 Strategic Defense Review described the GCC as a “natural partner.” The UK’s accession to the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement with Bahrain and the United States signals sustained commitment. Britain’s naval engineering pedigree, submarine expertise, and pilot training programs—Babcock already trains Qatar Amiri Joint Squadron pilots through the RAF partnership—offer exactly what Gulf partners seek: high-end capability that builds local capacity rather than perpetuating dependency. The Duqm model—joint venture, technology transfer, local employment—is a template that could be replicated across the GCC.

The Gulf’s Defense Recalibration

The MENA region is undergoing its most significant defense restructuring in decades. The Saudi-Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement of September 2025—modeled on NATO’s Article 5—marked a watershed. In January 2026, Turkey reportedly opened talks to accede, potentially creating a three-way security framework spanning South Asia, the Gulf, and the Eastern Mediterranean. The UAE-India Defense Partnership, the Greece-Cyprus-Israel Joint Action Plan, and Morocco-Israel military cooperation all point to a regionalization of security architectures inconceivable five years ago.

For scholars of international finance, this recalibration resembles the exercising of a portfolio of strategic options—a framework I have developed in my research applying financial derivatives theory to alliance behavior. Gulf states are not abandoning their American security underwriter; they are purchasing out-of-the-money call options on alternative partnerships. The Saudi-Pakistan SMDA is a hedge against US unreliability. Turkey’s potential accession adds optionality across multiple theaters. Britain’s task is to ensure its own partnerships are priced attractively enough—in technology transfer, co-development, and local capacity-building—to remain in the Gulf’s expanding options portfolio. But options decay with time. If Britain fails to exercise these advantages while Gulf states diversify, the premiums will be collected by France, South Korea, Turkey, and China instead.

Defense Exports as Fiscal Oxygen

The fiscal arithmetic is challenging. The Office for Budget Responsibility estimates that reaching 3 per cent of GDP for defense would cost an additional £17.3 billion annually by 2029–30. This is where the Gulf connection becomes not merely strategic but fiscal.

The near-complete UK-GCC free trade agreement would unlock defense procurement, maintenance contracts, and training partnerships that generate revenue for British industry and tax receipts for the Exchequer. Babcock’s FY25 revenues reached £4.83 billion—up 11 per cent—with UK defense accounting for 62 per cent and global defence clients roughly three-quarters of the total. Every pound of Gulf cooperation flowing through Devonport, Rosyth, or Duqm sustains the domestic industrial base Owen champions. Moreover, the UK’s proposed 5 per cent of GDP national security spending target by 2035—encompassing resilience, intelligence, and cyber alongside traditional defense—creates opportunities in precisely the domains where Gulf states are investing heavily: cybersecurity, space surveillance, electronic warfare, and autonomous systems.

The economic architecture extends further. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), launched at the 2023 G20 summit, envisions a multimodal transport, energy, and digital network connecting India through the UAE and Saudi Arabia to European markets via rail and shipping. The EU-India trade deal concluded in January 2026 has given IMEC fresh momentum, and Gulf states are positioning themselves as production and innovation hubs along the corridor. Britain—not itself a signatory to the IMEC memorandum of understanding but a close partner of virtually every nation that is—should be embedding its defense partnerships within this connectivity framework. A Royal Navy presence sustained through Duqm, combined with Babcock’s maintenance capabilities and Type 31 export potential, positions Britain as both security guarantor and economic partner along IMEC’s critical maritime arteries.

Israel sits at the intersection of every thread in this analysis. The Port of Haifa is IMEC’s gateway to the Eastern Mediterranean—without it, the northern corridor has no terminus. The Greece-Cyprus-Israel trilateral, now deepening through joint air defense procurement including IAI’s Barak MX system for Cyprus and a prospective $3.5 billion multi-layered package for Greece, functions as a strategic counterweight to the Turkey-SMDA axis in the Eastern Mediterranean. Babcock itself has partnered with Israel Aerospace Industries on radar technology for the UK Ministry of Defense’s SERPENS program and with Rafael on Sky Sabre ground-based air defense. Israeli defense exports reached a record $14.8 billion in 2024, with 54 per cent going to Europe—making Israel both a partner and a competitor in the markets Britain is targeting. The stalled Saudi-Israeli normalization, a precondition for IMEC’s rail link through Jordan, remains the corridor’s most significant political obstacle. Britain’s ability to navigate these cross-cutting relationships—Gulf partner, Israeli defense collaborator, IMEC stakeholder—will determine whether it can position itself as an indispensable connector rather than a marginal player in the region’s emerging architecture.

The Risk of Complacency

There are risks. In December 2025, the Royal Navy decommissioned HMS Lancaster in Bahrain—the last British frigate permanently stationed in the Gulf—without replacement, ending a continuous forward-deployed presence dating back to 2019. The Hudson Institute rightly called this “the wrong signal” at a moment when Gulf states are reassessing the reliability of Western security guarantees.

Gulf states have alternatives. China’s CETC International has won telecommunications contracts at Emirati exhibitions. France’s Dassault competes head-to-head for Saudi contracts. South Korea’s Hanwha is expanding aggressively. The Tempest program offers a generational opportunity to lock in Saudi participation in Britain’s most advanced combat platform—but only if partnership terms deliver genuine technology transfer and industrial participation, not merely an arms sale. Britain’s comparative advantage—trusted relationships, interoperability with US systems, and world-class naval engineering—is real but perishable.

Plymouth Sound to the Arabian Sea

Owen invokes Churchill to demand that Westminster stop “b*ggering around” and focus on defense. He is right. But the defense agenda cannot be contained within Plymouth’s breakwater. The Devonport renaissance and Gulf engagement are complementary legs of the same strategy.

What is needed is a coherent industrial defense strategy linking domestic capability-building with forward-deployed MENA partnerships. The GCC trade agreement must include defense cooperation provisions. The Duqm model must be scaled. The Type 31 must be marketed to Gulf navies. The Tempest partnership must deliver co-development. And the Royal Navy must maintain—not reduce—its presence East of Suez.

Owen says he has never seen so bright a future for Plymouth. He may be right. But that future depends on whether Britain has the strategic imagination to connect its resurgent dockyards to the world’s most dynamic defense market—and to the transformative infrastructure corridor that IMEC promises. Britain holds valuable strategic options in the Gulf. The question is whether Westminster will exercise them before time decay hands the premiums to its competitors. The tide is rising in the Gulf. Plymouth must ride it.

UK Defence Spending – House of Commons Library (February 2026)

UK Weighs Accelerating 3% Defence Target – Reuters/BBC (16 February 2026)

Prince William and Saudi Fighter Jet Deal – The National (30 January 2026)

UK Trade Minister: GCC FTA Is Imminent – Investing.com (5 February 2026)

The UK’s National Security Strategy in the Middle East – CSIS (December 2025)

HMS Lancaster Decommissioned – Royal Navy (5 December 2025)

All at Sea: UK Sends Wrong Signal – Hudson Institute

Saudi-Pakistan SMDA – Wikipedia

IMEC: Connectivity in an Era of Geopolitical Uncertainty – Atlantic Council (November 2025)

Babcock’s Duqm Naval Dockyard – Babcock International

Babcock FY25 Results – Babcock International (June 2025)

Gulf Defence Sector Goes for Growth – Armada International (May 2025)

Babcock–IAI Collaboration on SERPENS Radar – Babcock International (August 2022)

Israeli Defence Industry 2026 Preview – Breaking Defense (January 2026)

Israel’s Defence Exports and Greece-Cyprus Axis – Calcalist (December 2025)

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)