Troubles in the hallways? Change the culture. Everything a big institution does lies downstream from its culture. Institutions are groups. Culture is the sum of the habits of mind, sentiment, and deed that prevail among the individual human beings who constitute the group. It’s the collective attitude toward problems and solutions. If systemic troubles afflict an institution, getting a critical mass of members to acknowledge, and feel in their bones, that there is a problem marks the first step toward a solution. If group members agree that there is a problem and that solving it is important and urgent, they will mount a concerted effort to remedy whatever besets the institution.

An institution like the United States Navy.

If the U.S. Navy is in a bad way—and it is, amidst travails such as collisions and other mishaps at sea, shipboard fires, shipbuilding debacles, and even photos of rusty ships of war—changing minds and hearts will make a start toward renovating its standing as the world’s premier saltwater fighting force. As it prospers anew, it will regain its reputation among foes, friends, and bystanders. They will regard it as their worst enemy or best friend. And U.S. foreign policy and strategy will prosper in such embattled climes as the Western Pacific, Middle East, and North Atlantic.

So it behooves every mariner, from the greenest enlisted sailor to the most ancient chief petty officer or admiral, to take a direct hand in the nation’s foreign-policy fortunes. Including junior officers! They should view their duties that way and act accordingly—accepting personal risk when need be. At least, that was my message last week during an exchange with one newly commissioned officer during Q&A at a training command neighboring the Naval War College. The topic of my talk was naval logistics, but the question posed was this:

How can very junior folk—newcomers who by definition hold little authority over how the U.S. Navy transacts business—help bolster the Navy’s actual and perceived competence in the profession of arms?

An intriguing question, and it’s one with direct impact on U.S. foreign policy and strategy. After all, reputation is everything in world politics. To see why, think about the late Henry Kissinger’s formula for analyzing deterrence. Kissinger defined deterrence as a multiple of........

© The National Interest