Since April, nine countries—Armenia, the Bahamas, Barbados, Ireland, Jamaica, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, and Trinidad and Tobago—have formally recognized the state of Palestine. Belgium, Luxembourg, and Malta have hinted that they may soon follow suit. So has the United Kingdom’s new prime minister, Keir Starmer; in France, meanwhile, left-wing parties that joined the coalition that won the country’s recent election advocated for recognition. Nearly as many countries now recognize the state of Palestine (149) as well as one disputed territory, Western Sahara) as recognize Israel (165). The accelerating pace of recognitions could soon the two countries close to parity—and significantly, the new wave of states recognizing Palestine includes several large Western European countries whose leaders have openly said that they hope the rest of Europe will follow their lead.

The new recognitions of Palestine constitute a symbolic act of frustration with the bloody war in Gaza and Israeli policies in the West Bank. Leaders of the countries now recognizing Palestine have also indicated that they hope diplomatic recognition will have practical effects on the ground, boosting Palestinians’ sovereignty and bargaining power and improving the chances that the war could end with a successful two-state solution. Most of the outside actors trying to broker a long-term cease-fire between Israel and Hamas believe that advancing the creation of a viable Palestinian state must underpin any such deal. Norway’s prime minister, Jonas Gahr Store, called recognizing Palestine “an investment in the only solution that can bring lasting peace in the Middle East.”

But unilaterally recognizing a Palestinian state is the wrong first step, one that could exacerbate the region’s turbulence. Not only would Israel’s leadership and population see it as an unjust reward after Hamas’s October 7 massacre, but the move, taken alone, has no tangible benefits for Palestinians. Even as the need for real Palestinian sovereignty grows more and more acute, the Palestinian Authority (PA)—the putative ruler of a Palestinian state—is closer to collapsing than it has been since the height of the second intifada in 2002–2003. The Israeli government’s efforts over the past year to demolish the PA’s finances have driven the body to the brink of outright insolvency; in May, the World Bank warned that the PA could soon be forced into an irreversible fiscal crisis. The PA is nowhere near being ready to govern, and Palestinians neither like nor trust it. These challenging conditions would set a new Palestinian state up to fail from nearly the moment it was founded.

There is a genuine danger in recognizing a Palestinian state and raising expectations for its viability without tangibly helping a ruling authority prepare to govern effectively. Countries that wish to pave the way toward a two-state outcome must take a different, two-pronged approach. First, they must use political, economic, and diplomatic levers such as targeted sanctions on settler leaders and entities, and even on Israeli regional councils in the West Bank, to ensure that Israel ceases to encroach on a future Palestinian state’s land. Second, they must work to strengthen the foundations of a future state before declaring it into being.

Without immediate and targeted help from overseas actors, the PA could soon lose its grip on the West Bank—at which point it would stand no chance of ever resuming effective control over Gaza. And most Palestinians, deeply disillusioned with the PA, are themselves ambivalent about its continued rule; outside actors who wish to see the PA lead a future Palestinian state must first help the organization regain the trust of its constituents and nullify Israel’s objections over its lack of capacity to govern. In other words, anybody with the serious intent to promote a Palestinian state must put their energy—and their money—where their mouth is.

Recognizing the state of Palestine may appear to have many upsides and few risks. According to the standard definition in international law, a state must assert effective control over a permanent population, a defined territory, and a government, and it must have the capacity to conduct international relations. History shows, however, that decisions to recognize a new state do not always reflect whether the state has met these conditions but rather normative and political motives to support a people’s right to self-determination. A number of countries’ swift recognition of the state of Israel in 1948 illustrated that territorial disputes are not always a barrier to statehood. The United States and other countries recognized the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1960 while it was still embroiled in a civil war, and likewise recognized South Sudan in 2011 even though it did not exercise effective control over large parts of its territory.

The case of Kosovo, for instance, suggests that under the right circumstances, early international recognition can help drive a constructive state-building process. Following Kosovo’s 2008 unilateral declaration of independence, large countries including France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States quickly recognized its sovereignty. That move granted Kosovo legitimacy, unlocked aid and foreign support, and allowed it admittance into key international institutions.

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