Japan after Snap General Election

As a result of the snap election to Japan’s lower house held on 8 February, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), led by the incumbent Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, secured an unprecedented victory for the country’s entire post-war history.

On the Election Results and the Future Course of S. Takaichi’s Government

This came after several years of the LDP’s steadily diminishing its prevailing positions in Japan’s political landscape, a process that has been in place in the wake of the assassination of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2022. Amid mounting domestic and external challenges, the Japanese public appears to have grown weary of the revolving door of faces at the head of government and to have sought a degree of continuity within the ruling elite: “If the samurai cannot make it work, perhaps we should entrust the matter to a woman.” Moreover, taking into account her presenting herself, first and foremost, not as a woman, but as a prime minister fully immersed in her work, and, secondly, as a political successor to S. Abe.

If the scale of the LDP’s success was striking, the opposition’s defeat was equally crushing. On the eve of the election, it had reconfigured itself by means of merging the Constitutional Democratic Party and the Japanese Buddhist party Komeito, which had been allied with the LDP for nearly 30 years. The leader of the newly formed “Centrist Reform Alliance,” former Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda (2011–2012), is likely to resign in the near future.

Among other related developments, attention in the blogosphere was drawn to discussions assessing the performance of the so-called “Japanese Trumpists,” represented by the Sanseito party. On the one hand, the party increased its representation from 2 to 13 seats; on the other, it received half as many votes as it had in the upper house election held six months earlier.

Opinions and outlooks on this point are largely unanimous: during the campaign, S. Takaichi did not allow Sanseito to play on the increasingly sensitive issue of migration. The LDP leadership had prepared in advance a set of measures conveying roughly the following message to migrants: “In our country, you operate within clearly defined frameworks and for specific purposes agreed upon in advance. Any cases of you going beyond the mould will be regarded as a breach of those agreements, with corresponding repercussions.”

Setting aside two other topical themes of the election, depopulation and economic stagnation, let us briefly address the broader issue of defence, which understandably attracts particular attention abroad. As a fully-fledged member of the international community, modern Japan is entitled to revisit various aspects of this issue, making them more up-to-date and compatible with the current circumstances. For instance, if not to abandon altogether the unprecedented ‘anti-war’ Article 9 of the current Constitution, then at least to enshrine in it the right to possess all modern branches of the armed forces. De facto, they have long existed, albeit under euphemistic designations. Another possible revision point is the foundational defence documents — in response to a rapidly changing environment, which is indeed evolving swiftly.

Nevertheless, by now, let us reiterate, it is hardly justifiable to apply the term ‘militarisation’ to developments in Japan’s defence policies. The planned expenditure of USD 58 billion for these goals in 2026 will not raise defence spending above 1.5% of GDP, meaning it will remain among the lowest in the world on this indicator. Nor is it clear where S. Takaichi would find sufficient financial resources should she attempt, under significant pressure from D. Trump, to make the above-mentioned term more applicable. Doubts about the feasibility of such bids are voiced even within Japan’s Ministry of Defence.

Reactions and Expectations Abroad

According to some evaluations, the strengthening of Japan’s incumbent prime minister is “welcomed by all Asian countries except China.” In this particular assumption, it is only possible to agree with the latter part: in the PRC, little positive is expected from the election outcome, especially given the bilateral relations having sharply deteriorated during the first months of S. Takaichi’s premiership.

In particular, Beijing could hardly perceive as favourable the renewed emphasis on revising Japan’s core defence documents, both prior to and during the campaign debates. Moreover, there was a congratulatory message from Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te, who expressed his “eager anticipation” of further developing relations with Japan. Notably, the message was written in both Chinese and Japanese. To sum up, Beijing still remains sceptical of S. Takaichi’s post-election signals indicating her government’s intention to preserve “strategically reciprocally beneficial” relations with China.

The mood in the United States regarding the outcomes of the elections is quite the opposite. It comes across as natural, given Washington’s growing emphasis on maintaining and further strengthening its alliance with Japan amidst a broader shift of its national interests towards the Indo-Pacific region. On its part, Tokyo, under any government, including the incumbent one, consistently underlines its reciprocal commitment to bolstering ties with Washington, albeit increasingly guided by its own national interests.

US President D. Trump was reportedly satisfied with the results of his first meeting with Japan’s new prime minister, held in late October 2025 in Kuala Lumpur on the sidelines of an ASEAN event. On the eve of the elections discussed in the article, he sent S. Takaichi his best wishes for success. Their next bilateral meeting is scheduled for late March this year during S. Takaichi’s visit to the United States. The entire spectrum of US–Japan relations will be put under discussion, including numerous issues, primarily in trade and economy. The negotiating “soap opera” on this matter has been ongoing for almost a year, with another “episode” taking place immediately after the elections.

As for the future course of the empowered government of Japan regarding Russia, it is noteworthy that S. Takaichi attended the so-called “Northern Territories Day” and delivered a speech there. This annual event is held on 7 February, marking the signing in 1855 of a bilateral document bearing the symbolic title “Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and Russia” (the Treaty of Shimoda). It is likely that there is no coincidence in the elections scheduled for the period immediately after this event, which, nevertheless, has long since assumed a largely routine character.

Alongside the ritual reference to “Russian aggression in Ukraine” in the above-mentioned speech, S.Takaichi’s claims towards Russia were confined to resuming visits to the four southern islands of the Kuril chain by descendants of former Japanese residents of the islands. A rather moderate demand, leaving room for the restoration of relations that used to be rather positive during S. Abe’s premiership.

That is an objective to which both sides should aspire, even while preserving the “Northern Territories issue” in their bilateral relations. After all, what bilateral relations are entirely free of problems?

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on Asia-Pacific affairs

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