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Australia’s evolving nuclear posture: avoiding a fait accompli (Part 1 of 2)

7 0
11.10.2024

A monumental transformation: There has been a great deal of public criticism of Australia’s decision to acquire a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) via the AUKUS security partnership. The criticism has been both broad and deep, spanning political and industrial challenges, budgetary consequences, safety and environmental concerns, strategic risks, and the erosion of national sovereignty.While these are all worthy issues to bring to the fore of the public debate, one set of issues that have not received nearly as much attention are the ways in which AUKUS implicates Australia in US nuclear war planning.

From one perspective this is understandable given AUKUS does not involve plans for Australia to acquire nuclear-armed submarines or to station US nuclear weapons on Australian soil. However, when viewed from a wider perspective, AUKUS epitomises Australia’s geostrategic transformation and evolving nuclear posture within the US alliance.

The significance of this transformation is reflected in the fact that Australia will soon become ‘the only ally in the world to host and support military operations by forward-deployed US strategic bombers and SSN attack submarines’. This comes in addition to hosting mature US expeditionary Marine capabilities and a more recent rotational presence of US Army personnel and permanent associated support infrastructure.

Perhaps more significant than providing a ‘vast military launchpad’ for multiple forms of US power projection is the developing role of the ADF to seamlessly integrate with American military forces and to provide what is approaching full-spectrum support operations, including for nuclear missions.

AUKUS and nuclear war

Although the focus of AUKUS ‘pillar one’ is the acquisition by Australia of nuclear-powered, but conventionally-armed submarines, there are in fact several nuclear war planning dimensions to the broader security partnership.

The Australian government refuses to publicly broach the questions of how, where and against whom Australia’s future SSN force might be expected to operate both in peacetime and in the event of conflict. However, a common mission for this type of submarine is to chase down adversary nuclear-armed ballistic........

© Pearls and Irritations


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