WHAT if the doors of Prime Minister House had opened for the Baloch protesters demanding an end to enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, and what if the president of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan had given them a chance to share their painful stories? Wouldn’t this have been a substantial confidence-building measure for a province suffering from insurgency, terrorism, bad governance, and economic crisis for decades?

The victims’ families — currently camped out in the open in the midst of the Islamabad winter — had come for justice and needed empathetic treatment from the state. They were given a brutal reception by the police and heard spiteful remarks from caretakers in the government. If the caretakers’ response to the protesters is taken as the response of Pakistan’s institutions, it can only be interpreted as a sign that the centre remains unwilling to rethink its strategy for dealing with Balochistan.

If that is the case, how does one interpret the efforts by the security establishment to open a dialogue with Baloch society, especially its youth? Either the state institutions are confused, or they have been trapped by those who seek to spoil peace.

Stedman’s theory of the spoiler problem in peace processes can help shed more light on this situation. The theory is a pillar in conflict studies: it defines spoilers as leaders and parties who believe that an emerging peace threatens their power, interests, and worldview.

Like all ordinary Pakistanis, the Baloch simply yearn for respect.

Each spoiler is a distinct entity, and Stedman identifies four key challenges in managing spoilers: position (inside vs........

© Dawn