On March 31, 2026, Morocco and Indonesia moved to deepen their security ties during talks in Rabat between Morocco’s top security official and Indonesia’s ambassador. The discussions focused on implementing existing agreements and drafting a new memorandum of understanding to formalize cooperation between their security agencies. The planned framework centers on intelligence sharing, counterterrorism coordination and institutional exchanges, building on the broader strategic partnership signed in 2023.

This is not a breakthrough. It is an opportunity—and one Indonesia has yet to fully use.

The urgency is clear. Since the start of the Iran war in February 2026, disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have cut shipping, raised energy prices and destabilized global trade. Indonesia is directly affected. As a net energy importer, it faces higher fuel costs, pressure on subsidies and risks to inflation and fiscal stability.

That exposure should shape policy.

The Morocco agreement should be implemented at the operational level. This means establishing permanent intelligence-sharing channels, regular coordination between security agencies and clearly defined areas of cooperation. Without these steps, the agreement remains a framework without function. Diplomatic language alone does not improve security outcomes; institutional routines do.

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The focus should also be narrow and practical. Counterterrorism remains important, but the Iran war has highlighted maritime and supply chain vulnerability as more immediate risks.

The focus should also be narrow and practical. Counterterrorism remains important, but the Iran war has highlighted maritime and supply chain vulnerability as more immediate risks.

Shipping disruption—not direct conflict—is what spreads instability globally. Indonesia, as a major maritime state, has both the capacity and the incentive to engage more actively in this space. Morocco, positioned between the Atlantic and Mediterranean, provides a complementary geographic anchor. Coordinated monitoring, information-sharing on shipping risks and port security cooperation would give the agreement practical value.

The partnership should also be tested. Agreements that are not exercised tend to fail under pressure. Joint simulations—covering evacuation scenarios, trade disruptions or coordinated responses to security incidents—would ensure that cooperation mechanisms work in real conditions, not just on paper.

But bilateral cooperation is not enough.

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Indonesia should treat this agreement as a starting point for a broader security presence across the Middle East and North Africa. One partnership does not create a presence. A network does.

Jakarta’s response to the Iran war has been cautious. It has avoided alignment and emphasized balance and de-escalation. That approach reduces immediate political risk, but it does not generate influence. Neutrality without engagement limits Indonesia’s ability to shape outcomes or secure its interests in a region that directly affects its economy.

If Indonesia wants a meaningful role—or simply better protection against external shocks—it needs to expand beyond single agreements. That means building structured security cooperation with multiple partners across MENA: intelligence-sharing arrangements, maritime coordination frameworks and crisis-response mechanisms. These do not require alliances or military commitments. They require consistency and follow-through.

The logic is straightforward. The Iran war has shown that disruptions in one region quickly affect others. Energy markets react immediately. Shipping routes become uncertain. Insurance costs rise. Supply chains slow down. These effects reach Indonesia regardless of its political position on the conflict.

The logic is straightforward. The Iran war has shown that disruptions in one region quickly affect others. Energy markets react immediately. Shipping routes become uncertain. Insurance costs rise. Supply chains slow down. These effects reach Indonesia regardless of its political position on the conflict.

Reducing that exposure requires engagement at the source of disruption. That is what a broader security network provides.

Morocco can serve as an entry point. Its security institutions have experience working with partners across Europe and Africa, and its geographic position connects multiple regions. But one entry point is not enough. Indonesia needs to replicate this model across key countries in the Middle East and North Africa to build redundancy and reach.

This is not about power projection. It is about risk management.

The Iran war has made clear that waiting for stability is no longer viable. Countries that rely solely on distance or diplomacy will remain reactive, absorbing shocks rather than managing them. Those that invest in practical cooperation—quiet, technical, and sustained—will be better positioned to respond.

Indonesia has already taken a step with Morocco. The next step is expansion.

If it follows through, the agreement can become part of a broader shift toward active security engagement. If it does not, it will remain what it is now: a framework without impact.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

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