Recent reporting by Axios indicates that the Trump administration has issued invitations for a proposed “Board of Peace” to a select group of countries viewed as central to a post-conflict political framework for Gaza. The states cited as likely participants include the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The list is broad, geographically diverse, and clearly designed to convey international legitimacy. Yet it is also notable for who is not included. The absence of the United Arab Emirates—a country deeply involved in regional diplomacy and closely aligned with Israel—is striking and likely consequential.

This omission may not be accidental. Even before the board formally exists, the composition under discussion is already shaping expectations, sensitivities, and rivalries. What is emerging is less a settled architecture than a fluid and contested process, one in which invitations, hesitations, and exclusions carry as much meaning as formal commitments.

It is also important to distinguish between joining the Board of Peace and contributing forces to a proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF). These are related but fundamentally different commitments. Participation in the board would allow states to influence the political direction of Gaza’s post-war governance without necessarily placing troops on the ground. Conversely, it remains conceivable—though politically unlikely—that a country could contribute to an ISF without holding a formal seat at the political table. Many states appear to be calibrating their engagement with this distinction in mind, weighing political exposure separately from military or financial risk.

Among the invited states, Saudi Arabia occupies the most pivotal and consequential position. Riyadh’s posture to date appears best described as conditional engagement rather than outright rejection. The first and most immediate Saudi concern is financial and legal........

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