The collapse of the Kurdish entity in Syria, Rojava, in January 2026 sent shock waves all over the Kurdish diaspora in Europe and other parts of the world. The two questions that were raised among activists were how to stop the avalanche and how to strengthen relations with Israel and the Jewish diaspora with a view to underscoring the Kurdish cause in the international arena. To answer these questions, it is important to put them in a structural and historical framework and highlight three main topics: The role the Kurdish diaspora had played in the past; the role this diaspora may play in the future; and a road map for possible cooperation between Kurdish and Jewish diaspora organizations.

The rise of the Kurdish diaspora

The rise of the Kurdish diaspora is quite recent, starting in the last part of the twentieth century. Still, it has already played a crucial role. According to the Institut Kurde de Paris, it is considered “the best-organized and most active diasporic community in Europe.” In terms of numbers, some estimates put it at 1.5 to 2 million there. The Kurdish diaspora has been instrumental in raising international awareness for the Kurdish cause. In analyzing the relations between the Kurdish diaspora and the homeland, one can say that they are bound by a Gordian knot. The interplay between them is perceived in mutual and interrelated influences. For example, the rise of a class of Kurdish intelligentsia in the diaspora was crucial for energizing politics in the homeland. And vice versa, developments in the homeland energized Kurdish activities in the diaspora.

For a non-state nation such as the Kurds, the diaspora has been a cultural, political, and economic lifeline for the homeland. On the other hand, the homeland has granted motivation, raison d’être, and a sense of belonging and identity to Kurds in the diaspora. Similarly, Kurds outside Kurdistan fulfilled an indispensable role for developing a sense of solidarity among the Kurds as well as internationalizing the Kurdish cause. Thus, until the end of the 20th century, the international community knew very little about the Kurds. Kurdish activists and intellectuals were instrumental in drawing international attention to the Kurdish cause in the 21st century. In other words, they became the voice of Kurds and Kurdistan in the world. They made the invisible Kurds much more visible. At the same time Kurdish activists made an important contribution to the host country. The latest example is the appointment in early February 2026 of a Kurdish-origin politician, Dilan Yeşilgöz, as Dutch deputy prime minister and defense minister. The move was described as historic and highly symbolic for Kurds across Europe, reflecting growing Kurdish representations at senior levels of European politics. In addition, it might have a positive impact on relations between Holland and the Kurds in the homeland.

What role for the Kurdish diaspora in the future?

The role of the diaspora is crucial, especially now when Kurdish communities in the four parts of Greater Kurdistan are undergoing a severe crisis: In Turkey, they lost genuine leadership and orientation; in Iran, they are in the midst of a revolution whose results cannot be predicted; in Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is attempting to reverse the negative balance of power with Baghdad; and in Syria, Rojava is struggling to cling to whatever has remained of the January collapse.

Kurdish organizations in the diaspora may lead the process of soul-searching by asking what went wrong in the Kurdish historical experiments of nation-building and devise ways for moving forward. This requires critical thought, a revolutionary outlook, and the adoption of a meta-idea, namely, a concrete and achievable goal for the Kurds in the homeland. So far, the Kurdish leaderships in the homeland have adopted various ideologies, which fluctuated from independence to federation to autonomy to democracy, all of which caused sheer bewilderment among the leaderships themselves but especially among the Kurdish rank and file.

In his famous epic Mem U Zin, the 17th-century Kurdish national poet Ahmadi Xani called for strengthening Kurdish unity, the use of the Kurdish language, and the struggle for independence. Xani’s vision is even more relevant for the Kurds in the twenty-first century. Accordingly, by unifying the Kurdish voice and organizations, the diaspora may set a model for the Kurdish homeland, which has suffered from fragmentation and chronic disunity, which were further aggravated by borders.

The diaspora has the potential to champion the Kurdish language. While the central governments in the homeland have made relentless efforts to commit Kurdish linguicide, the diaspora can safeguard and further develop the language, similar to what the Jews have done for thousands of years. It is most crucial for the young generation and should be done on all levels: speaking, writing, and reading. This work is important because with the absence of a recognized state, the language has a cementing power for all Kurds and for Kurdish nationalism. Cognizant of this role, the KRG has recently sent 6,000 Kurdish textbooks to diaspora schools across Europe.

Kurdish organizations in the diaspora can play the role of both an energizer and pressure group for politicians in Kurdistan since they are freer to carry bold and revolutionary ideas, which leaders cannot in the homeland. Another role is to engage the West by emphasizing shared interests, which are currently more effective than shared values.

Diaspora leaders may act to remove the PKK from the terrorist list since, as long as such is the case, it is likely to stigmatize all Kurds. It has become a trend of blaming non-PKK Kurds for belonging to this organization as a means of harassing Kurdish activists in the diaspora, in Turkey, and in Syria, blaming them for being terrorists and tarnishing their image in the eyes of their societies. If the West had delisted Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which was behind terrible terrorist attacks, so quickly and so easily, there is no reason why it should not do the same with the PKK, which has carried out attacks against Western interests. Moreover, since the PKK had of late decided to disarm itself and stop its activities, there is no reason for keeping it on the terrorist list.

Another very important role for diaspora organizations is putting pressure to bear on Western countries to allow representation for the 40 million Kurds in international forums such as the UN or the World Economic Forum. This would put the Kurds, who were deprived of such status, on a par with Palestinian organizations.

A road map for cooperation between Kurdish and Jewish diaspora organizations.

The affinity between the Jewish and Kurdish peoples is of long standing and unique of its kind. The bonds between them have deepened further, especially now when both are under severe onslaught: The Kurds in their homeland and the diaspora due to Kurdophobia, and the Jews in the diaspora due to escalating antisemitism.

While it is problematic and even sometimes dangerous for the Kurds in the homeland to establish direct and open relations with the State of Israel, cooperation between Jews and Kurds in the diaspora is much more straightforward. Still, sensitivities of the Kurds even in the diaspora should be taken into consideration.

If this hurdle is overcome, the two organizations can establish common networks in different countries with clear-cut agendas. The goals of these networks should be the following: establishing forums for exchanging ideas and learning from the experience of each other; devising common strategies for facing antisemitism and Kurdophobia; organizing common events such as workshops, demonstrations, or festivals; joining forces for lobbying in different international forums; and organizing common cultural activities, especially among the young generation who do not have much knowledge about each other.

Another important goal is to set a model of positive cooperation between Jews and Muslims. While the peace accords between Israel and the Muslim Arab countries Egypt and Jordan have remained mainly on the governmental level, the Jewish- Kurdish case is distinctive in that it encompasses relations on the popular level. Similarly, Kurds and Jews may act together in the countries of the Abraham Accords, such as the United Arab Emirates, because in these countries there is more religious tolerance than in the four states that encompass the Kurdish homeland.

To sum up, this road map may be implemented if the Kurds in the diaspora are able to free themselves from the shackles of the governments in the homeland and if the Jews devise ways for real partnerships.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)