Iran’s geography, population, historical identity and military capabilities justify a substantial regional role. They do not confer a right to regional predominance. Israel, Saudi Arabia and other GCC members possess independent interests and significant capabilities, while Egypt and other Arab states have their own views of the regional balance. Their disagreements with Washington may encourage diversification and engagement with Tehran without producing acceptance of an order organised around Iranian primacy.

A diminished American presence would therefore create a contested distribution of power. Neighbouring governments could strengthen their capabilities, develop alternative partnerships and combine accommodation with measures against domination. Their choices would reflect national interests as well as external relationships. Tehran risks misjudging the region if it treats resistance to its policies principally as an extension of American influence.

Religious identity adds to this challenge. Iran’s governing ideology is rooted in Twelver Shia Islam, whereas most surrounding Arab states have Sunni-majority populations and distinct religious and political establishments. Claims associated with Iran’s revolutionary model consequently face limits of acceptance, particularly where military relationships acquire sectarian characteristics. Those limits are reinforced by concerns about sovereignty, political legitimacy and intervention in domestic affairs.

Yet religious differences do not make cooperation unattainable. Shared interests in commerce, secure borders and regional stability can support accommodation across sectarian boundaries. The essential requirement is that Iran’s neighbours be approached as independent participants in a common order. Opposition to American policies cannot confer a mandate on Tehran to define that order for them.

Nor can Iranian strategy safely assume that Washington will depart quickly or completely. The United States........

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