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In War, Trump and Putin Are Much Alike

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18.09.2026

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The idea that the United States would launch an ill-advised war with undefined aims in the Middle East in order primarily to benefit its former adversary, Russia, would under almost any previous administration have been the preserve solely of the wildest conspiracy theorists. And yet in both economic and military terms, the benefits of U.S. President Donald Trump’s war on Iran for Russia have been a mirror image of its harmful effects on the United States and its allies.

The surge in oil prices triggered by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz was welcome relief for Russia’s economy, struggling under the weight of its ongoing war against Ukraine. At the beginning of 2026, economists were predicting that economic challenges could force Putin to scale back the war or even, finally, enter peace negotiations seriously. By March, the boost in oil revenues meant Russia’s expected budget deficit was instead predicted to turn into a surplus. Demand for Russian fertilizer also soared as exports from the Gulf region all but stopped. And amid all this, Washington decided to suspend sanctions on Russian oil exports, boosting Moscow’s revenues still further and triggering even greater dismay among U.S. allies.

The idea that the United States would launch an ill-advised war with undefined aims in the Middle East in order primarily to benefit its former adversary, Russia, would under almost any previous administration have been the preserve solely of the wildest conspiracy theorists. And yet in both economic and military terms, the benefits of U.S. President Donald Trump’s war on Iran for Russia have been a mirror image of its harmful effects on the United States and its allies.

This article has been adapted from American Overthrow: Moscow’s Endgame in its Long War with Washington by Keir Giles (Hurst, 224 pp., September 2026).

The surge in oil prices triggered by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz was welcome relief for Russia’s economy, struggling under the weight of its ongoing war against Ukraine. At the beginning of 2026, economists were predicting that economic challenges could force Putin to scale back the war or even, finally, enter peace negotiations seriously. By March, the boost in oil revenues meant Russia’s expected budget deficit was instead predicted to turn into a surplus. Demand for Russian fertilizer also soared as exports from the Gulf region all but stopped. And amid all this, Washington decided to suspend sanctions on Russian oil exports, boosting Moscow’s revenues still further and triggering even greater dismay among U.S. allies.

Those allies were also alarmed by the enormous expenditure of munitions against Iran—not only vastly outstripping the number of air defense munitions supplied to Ukraine over the preceding four years, but also critically depleting arsenals that might otherwise have helped defend European and East Asian allies. In just three days of the war on Iran, more than 800 Patriot anti-missile interceptors were used—more than Ukraine had received throughout four years of fighting off Russian attacks. Supporters of Ukraine saw the mismatch as making a mockery of previous U.S. claims that munitions could not be sent to Ukraine because they had to be preserved for confrontation with China.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stands in front of a Patriot air defense missile system at a military training area in Mecklenburg, Germany, on June 11, 2024.Jens Büttner/picture alliance via Getty Images

Other decisions made Ukraine’s situation even worse by diverting weapons that had already been slated for sale to Europe, either for onward supply to Ukraine or for Europe’s own defense buildup. The Pentagon notified Congress that it intended to divert about $750 million in funding provided by NATO countries for Ukraine, and use it instead to restock the U.S. military’s own inventories—which, in the U.S. view, did not require the consent of the European countries that had provided the funds.

The overall impact was a windfall for Moscow that helped sustain its war. In addition, the Iran war further strained relations between the United States and its allies while diverting attention away from Ukraine. With a clear incentive to keep Iran in the fight, Moscow expanded intelligence sharing and military cooperation to assist Iran in striking back against U.S. and partner assets in the Gulf. This reportedly included providing Iranian forces with the locations of U.S. military assets, including warships and aircraft.

But in another example of Russia getting a free pass no matter how much its behavior harms the United States, the Trump administration dismissed its own intelligence that Russia was assisting Iran with targeting information—whether by simply denying it or, like White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt, by claiming that “it does not really matter.” This is consistent with Trump’s first term, when he declined to address reports of Russia paying bounties to the Taliban to kill U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

While Russia supported Iran with intelligence and targeting information, the United States appeared to........

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