WASHINGTON – U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping has revived a familiar debate: Would the United States defend Taiwan if China invaded?

Skeptics point to America’s competing priorities — from the conflict in the Middle East to operations in the Western Hemisphere — as evidence that Taiwan is slipping down the U.S. national-security agenda. Trump himself has questioned whether Americans would fight a war “9,500 miles away,” as well as describing arms sales to Taiwan as “a very good negotiating chip.” The change in U.S. rhetoric seemed like a gift to Xi.

But a close focus on Trump’s words obscures the realities on the ground. Over the past decade, U.S.-Taiwan relations have undergone a structural transformation. U.S. support for Taiwan is not a preference that could change with a U.S. administration, nor is it a bargaining chip. Rather, it is thoroughly embedded in the machinery of American power — in congressional mandates, defense planning, semiconductor supply chains, state-level partnerships and private-sector investment.

These ties make the relationship difficult for any U.S. administration to unwind and even more difficult for China’s government to weaken. The era when analysts parsed every presidential statement for clues about Taiwan policy is fading. High-level rhetoric still matters, but the durability of U.S.-Taiwan ties now rests less on individual leaders than on institutional momentum.

Despite new presidents coming to power in both Taipei and Washington over the past two years — and despite unprecedented Chinese military pressure on........

© The Japan Times