Taiwan’s Maritime Law Enforcement Operation Has Sparked Anger in Chinese Society
China Power | Security | East Asia
Taiwan’s Maritime Law Enforcement Operation Has Sparked Anger in Chinese Society
The reaction to a Taiwan Coast Guard confrontation reflects the existence of a particularly hardline strand of opinion on Taiwan among mainland Chinese.
Taiwan Coast Guard personnel board and inspect a fishing vessel from mainland China , Oct. 1, 2026.
On October 1, a Chinese mainland fishing vessel came into a confrontation with a Taiwan Coast Guard vessel near the Pratas (Dongsha) Islands. After the fishing boat refused to leave the waters, the Taiwan Coast Guard vessel used a water cannon against it, eventually forcing it to leave the area.
Just one day earlier, the Taiwan Coast Guard had detained another Chinese fishing vessel near Penghu and taken control of its seven crew members.
The incident quickly attracted widespread attention on Chinese social media. Videos showing a Taiwan Coast Guard vessel spraying the Chinese fishing boat with a water cannon were widely circulated, prompting widespread criticism of what many described as the Taiwanese vessel’s heavy-handed conduct. Some commentators interpreted the incident as a deliberate provocation by Taipei on the National Day of the People’s Republic of China.
However, much of the criticism was directed not only at Taiwan, but also at the Chinese government itself. Some argued that Beijing’s repeated “concessions” toward Taiwan had encouraged Taipei to become increasingly assertive. Others even questioned whether Beijing is capable of effectively protecting Chinese fishermen. The reaction reflects the existence of a particularly hardline strand of opinion on Taiwan in mainland Chinese society, which frequently criticizes the government for being “too weak” toward Taiwan.
This challenges a narrative in which Beijing is portrayed as the main driver of coercive pressure against Taiwan, while mainland Chinese society simply passively absorbs Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda about national (re)unification. In fact, in recent confrontations between Taiwan’s government vessels and civilian vessels from the mainland, Beijing has often exercised restraint and refrained from using its superior military capabilities in response.
Following the October incident, for example, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC State Council merely called on Taiwan not to “use dangerous methods to treat mainland vessels and crew members in a heavy-handed manner.” Beijing has so far refrained from escalating the situation through its maritime forces.
This resembles Beijing’s handling of the February 2024 fishing boat incident near Kinmen, in which two mainland fishermen died after their vessel capsized during a confrontation with Taiwan’s Coast Guard. At the time, visible anger emerged on mainland Chinese social media. Related Weibo posts received more than 50 million views, accompanied by calls for retaliation against Taiwan. However, Beijing ultimately responded in a relatively restrained manner.
This raises an important question. Beijing has conducted repeated military drills around Taiwan in recent years, and confrontations between Chinese fishermen and the Taiwan Coast Guard might appear to provide convenient opportunities to demonstrate Chinese military power. So why has Beijing refrained from doing so?
Beijing must strike a balance between military deterrence and the image of itself as a guarantor of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. A forceful response to Taiwan might satisfy public anger in the short term, but it could also reinforce Taiwanese society’s perception of the mainland as a security threat over the longer term.
Beijing frequently uses military exercises as a signal to Taipei and the international community of its determination to safeguard national unity. However, although Beijing continues to insist that such activities are directed only at the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and “Taiwan independence separatist forces,” polling suggests that a substantial share of the Taiwanese public regards these activities as a threat to Taiwan. Against this backdrop, any retaliatory action by the China Coast Guard or the People’s Liberation........
