Flashpoints | Security | East Asia

Will Taiwan Fight? We Need Better Evidence.

Both those making pessimistic predictions and those confidently rejecting them often rely on thin evidence.

Simon Shuster’s recent article in The Atlantic, asking whether Taiwan might simply “give up” in the face of growing pressure from China, attracted considerable attention in Taiwan and among the broader community of China and Taiwan watchers. Some praised the piece for its candid analysis and for asking uncomfortable questions that are too often avoided in discussions about Taiwan’s security. Others were somewhat less impressed. 

The article quickly came under fire from Taiwanese and (mostly) Taiwan-based foreign analysts, who pointed to factual errors, questionable interpretations of domestic politics, and what they saw as a selective and misleading portrayal of Taiwanese society. Legislator Puma Shen, one of those interviewed for the article, issued a public statement accusing Shuster of taking his comments out of context. The Taipei Times devoted an editorial to rebutting the article, and even Taiwan’s National Security Council weighed in, with Secretary General Joseph Wu publicly rejecting its central premise.

Essentially, there are rather good reasons to take these criticisms seriously. Some concern basic facts and context, which are obviously important when making such a sweeping argument about Taiwan. That said, the reaction also exposed another problem. A significant part of the response has questioned what a foreign journalist who spent limited time in Taiwan and has no evident prior expertise on Taiwan or the region can really know about Taiwanese society. Critics pointed to a lack of understanding of Taiwanese politics, insufficient engagement with Taiwanese voices and opinion polls showing considerable willingness to defend Taiwan, and Taiwan’s own experience – from democratization and the Sunflower Movement to its remarkable response to COVID-19 – as evidence of a society capable of mobilizing when necessary.

As compelling as these arguments are, none of them give us a particularly convincing answer either.

Predicting what Taiwan and its people would actually do if China decided to use force is extraordinarily difficult. Both those making pessimistic predictions and those confidently rejecting them often seem to rely on evidence that tells us much less than we think.

Opinion polls are perhaps the clearest example. As argued previously in The Diplomat, they are useful for understanding attitudes, but telling a pollster that you would defend Taiwan is very different from making that decision when missiles are falling, casualties are mounting, electricity and communications are disrupted, and nobody knows whether outside help is coming. That does not make polls useless. Questions involving actual costs, such as longer military service, higher taxes, or greater personal obligations, can tell us more. But saying that you are willing to sacrifice something and actually sacrificing it are not the same thing.

Historical examples have only limited relevance. Taiwan’s democratization, the Sunflower Movement, and its response to COVID-19 have all been cited as evidence of a society capable of mobilizing when necessary. Comparisons can also be drawn with Finland’s resistance to the Soviet Union during the Winter War, Ukraine’s response to Russia’s invasion, or other societies that proved far more willing to resist than outsiders expected. These are indeed powerful examples. But what exactly do they tell us about how Taiwanese society would respond to a Chinese attack today?

Israel offers a useful example of why we should be careful in making predictions. Israeli society has repeatedly shown an extraordinary ability to mobilize against military threats. Following the October 7 attacks, more than 300,000 reservists were mobilized in a very short period, including Israelis who returned from abroad to report for duty. Nonetheless, during COVID-19, Israel struggled to sustain public compliance with government restrictions. Trust and willingness to follow regulations declined as the crisis continued. The same society generated two very different responses to calls for public action.

The type of threat, its perceived seriousness, public trust, political divisions, and personal costs can all shape how societies respond. Historical experience and comparisons can give us useful clues. But they cannot tell us what Taiwanese will do when confronted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

So perhaps we need to look elsewhere. Instead of endlessly asking whether Taiwanese will fight or give up, we should look more closely at what Taiwanese society, its politicians, and its military are actually doing as the threat from China grows.

And here the picture remains concerning.

Taiwan has struggled with military recruitment and retention, personnel shortages, and a reserve force in which too few receive regular and meaningful........

© The Diplomat