In the final part of a six-part series on AUKUS infrastructure, Peter Briggs argues that Pillar 1 cannot deliver on schedule or budget, and that Australia should pause its HEU pathway and assess proven LEU alternatives.

A central question now confronts Australian defence policymakers and the public alike: Is it too late to change course?

When pressed on whether AUKUS Pillar 1 can realistically deliver an operational, nuclear-powered Australian submarine capability, official commentary routinely sidesteps compounding engineering, industrial and financial barriers. This was vividly illustrated on ABC TV’s 7.30, where Assistant Minister for Defence Pat Conroy introduced a new narrative twist, asserting that the foreign Submarine Rotational Force–West (SRF-W) presence at HMAS Stirling will strictly conclude in 2032 as the first Australian Virginia-class hull arrives. This tight “2032 departure” sunset clause is not reflected in the AUKUS Joint Leaders’ Statement or other official announcements. Nor does it reflect the reality of the US Navy establishing Naval Support Activity Stirling, to manage logistic support, including for USN families living locally. The Commander, Submarine Forces Pacific’s announcement on 10 June 2026, re-establishing US Submarine Squadron 3 at HMAS Stirling, leaves little doubt as to their intentions:

“Adding an additional forward-positioned submarine squadron in the Indo-Pacific … CSS-3 enables our submarines and crews to respond rapidly in support of the US joint force mission of regional deterrence.”

“Adding an additional forward-positioned submarine squadron in the Indo-Pacific … CSS-3 enables our submarines and crews to respond rapidly in support of the US joint force mission of regional deterrence.”

Political tap dancing aside, the fundamental question remains unanswered: what happens to Australian maritime posture when that US Virginia is simply not available for delivery? Judging by his failure to answer many of the questions put to him on the ABC’s 7.30, this is a hypothetical scenario and therefore not worthy of considering or answering. A refreshing if not heroic take on risk management indeed!

Every objective metric confirms that Pillar 1 cannot deliver its promised outcomes on schedule or within budget. Pausing this trajectory is not an admission of failure; it is an urgent strategic necessity. Every day Australia continues down this unworkable path wastes billions of dollars and precious time that should be allocated to securing a viable, sovereign undersea capability.

The anatomy of a systemic failure

To understand why changing course is imperative, one must evaluate the individual component assumptions underpinning Pillar 1. None withstand critical scrutiny:

US........

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