In the third part of his piece for the Foreign Policy Rethink series, Geoff Raby examines how middle powers can navigate a world of competing great powers – and why Australia’s current approach is becoming more vulnerable.

China’s soft power took a bashing, especially in the West, when it flirted with what became known as ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy. This marked the decisive break with Deng Xiaoping’s guiding maxim for conducting China’s foreign policy: bide your time, hide your strength. Wolf warrior diplomacy, with its confrontational style, reflected Xi Jinping’s view that China’s time had finally arrived. China could and must be more assertive internationally. The approach was attenuated, however, when it became obvious that it had been counterproductive.

China has since sought to recover its standing, starting with the Global South. In 2022, two major policy initiatives were announced to underpin Xi Jinping’s vision of a world order based on his principle of a ‘global community of shared future’. The Global Development Initiative (GDI) was launched in 2022. Intended to align with the UN’s Global Development Agenda, it serves to emphasise China’s relative strengths in digital and green technologies suitable for adoption by poorer countries. The Global Security Initiative (GSI), also introduced in 2022, is based on absolute sovereignty and non-interference, rejecting unilateralism and bloc-security alliances. In May 2023, the Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI) was announced. It emphasises diversity of civilisations and defines human rights as relative to a particular country’s conditions.

Beijing claims that over 100 countries have associated themselves with these initiatives. China has stepped up its bilateral training and technical assistance programs under them and linked them to the BRI. Reflecting Beijing’s broader ambitions, Africa has become a particular focus of attention.

This increasingly contested and competitive global order opens opportunities and challenges for middle powers.

Middle power diplomacy in a world of bounded orders

The shape of the new multipolar world of bounded orders has emerged more quickly than most would have expected. For middle powers, however, it presents a well-worn path to follow, requiring skilful and patient diplomacy.

For the Global South, several academics have been urging a policy of ‘Active Non-alignment’ (ANA): in a new era of great power competition, states can ‘hedge their bets’ or ‘play the field’, refusing or resisting to align themselves totally or even to a substantial degree with one or other of the great powers. In other words, middle powers have agency. On specific issues, they can align with one or other great power; they can also form coalitions around specific issues to attract great power support for their interests.

ASEAN has been quite explicit in not wanting to choose and, importantly, not wanting to be forced to choose between either of the great powers. Some ASEAN states, namely........

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