Taiwan Opposition Leader's Visit to Mainland China: Peace Mission with a Political Purpose
Taiwan Opposition Leader’s Visit to Mainland China: Peace Mission with a Political Purpose
When Cheng Li-wun traveled to Beijing at the personal invitation of Xi Jinping, she brought more to Beijing than a desire for peace: she brought an alternative strategy for Taiwan’s survival. It is impossible to fully realize the importance of such a move for Taipei, Washington, and regional stability in Asia.
Why is this so important? First, to answer this question, one should not rely on the usual Taiwan binary of independence vs. unification, the US and China as the key players, hawks vs. doves, etc. Such an approach limits the full complexity and richness of events. Chinese civilization does not play with binary categories, but with nuances. This was not simply a concession to China but rather a strategically thought-out move by an astute politician who believes that Taiwan’s security depends not only on weapons and military expenses but also on an effective dialogue with Beijing.
The Visit and Its Geopolitical Significance
From the very beginning, the visit of the opposition leader included several important messages. For example, Cheng chose Nanjing, the birthplace of Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Kuomintang. The choice was not random: this was not an attempt to ignore the past, but a step towards creating a common ground between the two sides in the face of the shared history. Cheng continued to Shanghai, where she engaged in talks with Taiwanese businessmen operating in the city, and met Chen Jining, the Party Secretary of Shanghai, who will probably join the Politburo Standing Committee next year.
Afterward, she arrived in Beijing, where Xi personally received Cheng with two other members of the Politburo Standing Committee. Such a meeting shows the importance and significance of the visit for the leadership of China.
Speaking to his guests, Xi Jinping did not adopt an antagonistic or threatening tone. On the contrary, he stated his vision in four points: to harmonize minds, protect the shared homeland, promote welfare, and materialize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people. The president avoided mentioning “One Country, Two Systems” and “One China Principle,” which he prefers. Instead, he used the soft version – “1992 Consensus,” the definition that leaves plenty of space for different approaches. Finally, there was no joint statement after the meeting, a move designed to leave some freedom to Cheng to make her own statement in the media.
The reaction of the leadership of China after the meeting became clear the next day when Beijing issued 10 economic measures aimed at developing relations between Beijing and Taipei. It was not only the usual rhetoric about peace in the region, but also quite practical steps, including the liberalization of tourism and the resumption of aquaculture exports from Taiwan, as well as the creation of a communication mechanism between the CCP and the KMT. Even if one does not share this approach, it is clear that Beijing treats the political opponent as a respectable interlocutor with whom one could speak.
Not ‘Choosing China’ – Choosing a Different Theory of Survival
The critics, especially from the ruling pro-sovereignty Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), saw in Cheng’s meeting with the Chinese president an example of submission and appeasement. Such an attitude could be regarded seriously, but at the same time is somewhat misleading. Indeed, it is not a case of appeasing Xi Jinping or making concessions to China. Rather, it is about the two theories of survival.
The first theory of Taiwan’s survival claims that the only way of protecting the country against attacks is through creating strong defense and maintaining close cooperation with Washington. The second theory sees the need to develop communication channels with Beijing in addition to building a solid defense. In fact, as the former chairman of the KMT said, Taiwan needs “2Ds” – defense and dialogue. The second is where Cheng Li-wun puts the stress, and it is why she decided to talk to Xi Jinping.
In this regard, the current deadlock in the parliament over the proposed $40 billion special defense budget is important. While the government insists on this large budget, the KMT proposes an alternative, smaller budget of $12 billion. Although this could be seen as a sign of weakening the defense system, it is also a political reality. No matter what, this visit of Cheng Li-wun strengthened the position of KMT in the internal disputes, because Beijing welcomed the visit and immediately issued favourable measures to Taiwan.
“Taiwan should no longer be a flashpoint for potential conflict. It should become a symbol of peace jointly safeguarded by Chinese people on both sides of the Strait.” — Cheng Li-wun, Beijing, April 10, 2026.
“Taiwan should no longer be a flashpoint for potential conflict. It should become a symbol of peace jointly safeguarded by Chinese people on both sides of the Strait.” — Cheng Li-wun, Beijing, April 10, 2026.
The Geopolitical Dynamics: Xi, Trump, and the Strait as a Chessboard
However, the broader geopolitical context also adds to the importance of the opposition leader’s visit. Indeed, it is expected that President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping will meet in Beijing in May, making it one of the most important meetings of the year. The pre-summit visit to Beijing undertaken by a representative of Taiwan is best characterized by the “pre-negotiation layer”— informal, deniable, yet highly consequential — introduced by the geopolitical analyst Djoomart Otorbaev, former Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic.
In particular, through such a move, Beijing makes it known to Washington that Taiwan has no consensus on the question of independence, but the relations on both sides of the strait are running smoothly. As a result, the upcoming summit of Xi Jinping and Donald Trump can concentrate on their agenda. Although it is too early to discuss the results, we should mention the words of the expert Wen-Ti Sung in the Atlantic Council Dispatches, through Cheng’s visit to China, the “Taiwan Strait tension issue will be sidelined from the Xi–Trump summit. Both leaders would then be free to focus on business and trade rather than geostrategic confrontation.”
Cheng Li-wun noted in Nanjing that Taiwan should not become “a pawn in great power rivalry.” This matters because a Taiwan Strait crisis would be catastrophic not only for the island itself but also for global supply chains, semiconductor production, and financial markets, and it would have far-reaching consequences for the global economy and the entire architecture of Indo-Pacific security. It is not surprising that Washington and Beijing take a careful and attentive approach to Taiwan to avoid miscalculation.
A Cautious Optimism – and What Comes Next?
It is premature to claim that all problems have found solutions, although it is clear now that Beijing has not refused to continue the discussion. The measures offered to Taipei were meaningful, but at the same time reversible. Besides, as a result of Cheng’s visit, her political position became stronger in the KMT, but it is not yet clear whether she would be able to win the presidential election in 2028. However, in a recent poll in Taiwan conducted before the meeting with the Chinese president, 73.9% of Taiwanese hold an unfavorable view of the Chinese Communist Party – the lower or the higher the education, the greater the percentage of disapproval.
It is interesting to see the results of the poll after Cheng’s Beijing trip.
Despite everything, it becomes clear that Beijing’s door is open for a dialogue. The visit of Cheng shows that the frozen relations are not an eternal condition – high-level talks are possible, and the window of opportunities is still open. Moreover, with a possible victory of the KMT in the presidential election in 2028, Cheng Li-wun will be able to create a stable channel of communication with Mainland China that would prevent the escalation of crises, especially taking into account that Beijing would receive no threats related to independence. China could then offer to the Taiwanese more cooperative steps and goodwill gestures to show them the benefits of unification. Of course, it does not guarantee success, but certainly, the unpredictability of Donald Trump and the questionable security guarantees recently provided by the United States play an important role in China’s favour.
Here comes the historical analogy with Lien Chan’s “peace trip” to China in 2005 – the first visit by a KMT leader to the mainland since 1949 – that helped launch a period of peaceful development. It became possible due to the fact that Ma Ying-jeou, the winner of the 2008 election, pursued quite a pragmatic approach. Clearly, Cheng Li-wun tries to follow his example.
As she said in Nanjing, the goal of her visit was “to show the world that it is not just Taiwan that unilaterally hopes for peace.”
Ricardo Martins – Doctor of Sociology, specialist in European and international politics as well as geopolitics
Follow new articles on our Telegram channel
