Kashmir Has the Rivers. Why Is It Still Buying Power?
Jammu and Kashmir sits on one of the richest hydropower reserves in India: an estimated 18,000 megawatts of gross potential, with 14,867 megawatts formally identified for development.
Only 3,540.15 megawatts have actually been commissioned. That leaves 76.19 percent of the identified potential untouched, a gap large enough to explain most of what ails the region’s power economy.
This is the number that should anchor the whole debate about Kashmir’s finances. Politicians routinely discuss subsidies, tariff hikes and central grants, but those arguments skip past the underlying problem: the region has built out barely a quarter of the hydropower it already knows it can generate.
Ownership compounds the shortfall. Of the 3,540.15 megawatts already commissioned, only 1,197.4 megawatts sit in the Union Territory’s own sector. The central sector controls 2,250 megawatts, and private players hold another 92.74 megawatts.
So even the power generated inside Kashmir borders doesn’t automatically translate into revenue or savings for the people who live here.
Winter makes the problem worse, as demand for electricity climbs sharply during the cold months, precisely when run-of-river projects, which depend on flowing water rather than stored reservoirs, produce the least.
The system then buys expensive power from outside the region at the moment consumers need relief most.
It’s a mismatch built into the geography, and it punishes households twice: once through higher bills, and again through the subsidy strain it puts on public finances.
Distribution losses add a third dimension........
