This update covers the protection of the freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly in Kyrgyzstan from October 2025 to March 2026. It has been prepared by International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) for the CIVICUS Monitor.

Early parliamentary elections held in Kyrgyzstan in November 2025 further consolidated the power of political forces supportive of President Sadyr Japarov, against a backdrop of limited political competition and ongoing pressure on dissenting voices. The detention of a group of opposition figures in the lead-up to the elections reinforced concerns about the misuse of criminal charges to marginalise political opponents. Among those targeted was opposition party leader Temirlan Sultanbekov, who was previously prosecuted ahead of local elections in November 2024 when he spent months in pre-trial detention before ultimately receiving a probationary sentence.

In February 2026, President Japarov suddenly dismissed his close ally, head of the State Committee for National Security (SCNS) Kamchybek Tashiev, ending a powerful tandem that had shaped politics in Kyrgyzstan since 2020. The dismissal came amid debate over possible early presidential elections linked to uncertainty about the length of Japarov’s current term. While the Supreme Court later ruled out early elections, members of a group of 75 public figures who called for such elections – and were perceived as supporters of Tashiev – faced questioning and detention. In addition, officials linked to Tashiev were removed from their posts. In a further turn of events, in March 2026, the tax service published an investigation implicating Tashiev’s family and associates in systematic corruption schemes at a state oil company. A criminal investigation on corruption was opened and Tashiev – who led anti-corruption efforts while heading the SCNS – was also summoned for interrogation, although not formally designated as a suspect.

During his tenure as security chief, Tashiev oversaw a widening campaign against government critics. His departure and subsequent initiatives to reform the security apparatus therefore sparked cautious hope for a change in the authorities’ approach to dissent. Following a civil society appeal to review cases against journalists and activists, a presidential spokesperson indicated that law enforcement practices would be reconsidered, with greater emphasis on preventive measures and less frequent use of arrest during investigations. However, he did not signal any fundamental shift regarding the misuse of criminal legislation to penalise government critics in retaliation for their legitimate exercise of fundamental freedoms – a pattern that persisted throughout the reporting period.

Among those subject to sustained pressure were the independent investigative platforms Kloop and Temirov Live. In October 2025, a local court declared materials by Kloop, Temirov Live, and the affiliated Ayt Ayt Dese “extremist” and banned their activities, rendering it unlawful to share, engage with, or possess their publications. While two Kloop journalists sentenced to prison in September 2025 were released on probation following appeals, Temirov Live’s director Makhabat Tazhibek kyzy remained imprisoned. However, in March 2026, the Supreme Court ordered a review of her case based on an opinion from the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD), which found her detention unlawful and linked to her journalistic work. As the new trial began later the same month, Tazhibek was released under a travel ban pending the outcome of the proceedings. Human rights defenders welcomed the review of her case and her release from custody as steps in the right direction but stressed that the charges against her must be quashed, in line with the WGAD’s calls.

The campaign against Kloop and Temirov Live extended to their representatives in exile, including through criminal charges initiated in absentia and attempts at forced return. In October 2025, Kloop co-founder Rinat Tukhvatshin learned that Kyrgyzstan had sought a so-called Red Notice against him through Interpol. While the request was ultimately rejected, it illustrated the dangers facing critical voices even outside the country. Repressive measures against family members and colleagues in Kyrgyzstan are also used as a means of putting pressure on journalists in exile. The UN WGAD noted that the targeting of Makhabat Tazhibek kyzy was linked to her being the wife of Bolot Temirov, Temirov Live’s founder, who was expelled from the country in 2022. Notably, the campaign that led to his expulsion was triggered by the publication of an investigation into corruption involving Kamchybek Tashiev’s family, whose findings were similar to those of the recent, officially endorsed inquiry following Tashiev’s fall from power.

Other journalists, bloggers, and activists also faced politically motivated criminal cases, with charges typically brought under broadly worded provisions of the Criminal Code, such as those penalising the instigation of riots, discord, or the forceful seizure of power, which are used to penalise the legitimate exercise of civic freedoms. UN human rights experts have repeatedly raised the alarm about this practice.

Musician-poet Askat Zhetigen, who was imprisoned in 2024 for allegedly calling for the forceful seizure of power after criticising President Japarov, was placed in a punishment cell in March 2026 in apparent retaliation for reporting alleged corruption and rights violations in prison. After the case attracted wide public attention, he was released early from the punishment cell, and the Ombudsperson’s office said it would investigate the events, although no officials were known to have been held accountable at the time of writing. This case reinforced concerns about the gap in efforts to prevent torture and ill-treatment resulting from the dissolution of the National Centre for the Prevention of Torture in September 2025, with the transfer of its functions to the Ombudsperson’s Office being under way.

The five-year probationary sentence issued against human rights defender Rita Karasartova, who was charged with inciting riots after sharing an appeal from an opposition activist on social media, was upheld on appeal in December 2025. The UN WGAD concluded that she was targeted for exercising her freedom of expression and criticised the government for “recycling” charges previously used against her in the so-called Kempir Abad case. The Working Group also found that her detention and that of four other women activists in the Kempir Abad case – where they were charged with instigating unrest after peacefully opposing a government-negotiated border deal with Uzbekistan – violated international human rights law and constituted retaliation for their civic engagement on a politically sensitive issue. That case eventually ended with the acquittal of Karasartova and her co-defendants in June 2024 – a decision upheld on appeal in March 2026, following an extended appeals process initiated by prosecutors.

In February 2026, an appeals court reduced independent journalist Kanyshay Mamyrkulova’s sentence from four to three years’ probation after acquitting her of inciting inter-ethnic hatred, while upholding her conviction for calling for riots. Both charges were brought after she criticised a border deal with Tajikistan. Meanwhile, in January 2026, retired journalist Bayan Jumagulova was denied permission to travel abroad for essential medical treatment, as a criminal case on inciting ethnic hatred related to her social media posts remained under review. The case against her has been pending since mid-2024, when she travelled to Kyrgyzstan for a visit after living in Germany for many years.

Activist and blogger Aibek Tenizbaev also faced charges of inciting inter-ethnic hatred, initiated following his criticism of Kremlin-linked media in Kyrgyzstan, particularly the recently launched Nomad TV channel. First detained in December 2025, he was released under a travel ban pending further investigation. In another case of concern, in February 2026, media designer Ernis Zheentaev was sentenced to six years in prison for allegedly calling for riots and disseminating “extremist” materials over social media posts critical of the authorities.

Legislation which excessively restricts the exercise of civic freedoms remained of serious concern. Draft implementing regulations put forward in February 2026 heightened fears of expanded state control over media following the adoption of a new media law in summer 2025. While the law requires both traditional and online media to obtain compulsory state registration, civil society actors warned that the proposed implementing regulations would increase the risk of arbitrary enforcement in this context. In particular, they raised concerns about unspecified requirements for supporting documents, an expanded list of cases requiring compulsory re-registration, and broader grounds for denying registration or re-registration. Accordingly, they called for revisions of the draft regulations. The final version had yet to be presented at the time of writing.

A report published by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in December 2025 confirmed the chilling impact of the 2024 “foreign representative” law. Most of the 115 CSOs surveyed reported self-censorship following its adoption, while many reduced their activities and some closed altogether – particularly groups working with vulnerable populations. Pressure from law enforcement authorities also increased, alongside social media attacks, while cooperation with state bodies declined. The report concluded that civil society’s watchdog role has been seriously weakened, with organisations across the board – including those beyond the human rights sector – now avoiding activities that could be construed as “political”.

In December 2025, three representatives of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), who were due to take part in a human rights film festival organised by Bir Duino Human Rights Movement, were denied entry to Kyrgyzstan without explanation. This incident raised concerns about growing hostility toward not only domestic but also international human rights organisations.

In December 2025, a court-sanctioned ban on protests in central Bishkek – first introduced in spring 2022 at the request of the Russian embassy – was again extended. Those wishing to assemble peacefully are required to gather instead in Gorky Park, with President Japarov stating that people may protest there “all day” and say “whatever they want,” provided they “don’t lie” or “call for riots.”

Ahead of a planned peaceful protest against the prolonged blanket ban, human rights defender Tolekan Ismailova, environmental rights activist Bermet Borubaeva, and video operator Bulat Satarkulov were detained on 13th March 2026 and questioned for several hours before being released. In Ismailova’s case, police focused on her social media posts condemning Russia’s war against Ukraine and expressing support for Ukrainian colleagues, suggesting these could “spark conflict” through broad “public resonance.” She was also questioned about the activities and funding of her organisation, Bir Duino Human Rights Movement. Human rights groups raised concern that Ismailova was being subjected to pressure in retaliation for her peaceful human rights engagement, which has also included legal petitions to challenge the protest ban in Bishkek.

Reported challenges in organising a women’s rights assembly in Bishkek on 8th March 2026, International Women’s Day, reinforced concerns about undue restrictions on assemblies. According to the organisers, they were not allowed to hold a march as in previous years and were only given the green light to gather in Gorky Park following an appeal to the president, although the Law on Assemblies requires notification rather than approval for rallies, and mandates that bans must be court sanctioned. Following the rally, organisers and participants faced verbal attacks on social media and during a state TV broadcast, with critics accusing them of undermining “traditional” values.

Proposed amendments to the Law on Assemblies, initiated by an MP in March 2026, would expand the powers of local authorities to restrict where protests may take place without court approval, including by designating specific venues for holding assemblies. If adopted, these provisions would make it easier for authorities to prevent demonstrations within the sight and sound of target audiences, in violation of international standards.

During the reporting period, the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed by the EU and Kyrgyzstan in 2024, continued to await ratification. The European Parliament has called for concrete measures to address the country’s deteriorating human rights situation before the treaty’s final approval and full implementation, with its Kyrgyzstan rapporteur emphasising that the Parliament’s human rights engagement is intended to ensure Kyrgyzstan upholds the commitments it has voluntarily undertaken.

President Japarov’s controversial October 2024 proposal to consider reinstating the death penalty in response to a shocking murder of a young girl drew strong criticism from the international community. It eventually stalled, with the Constitutional Court ruling in December 2025 that reintroducing capital punishment would breach both Kyrgyzstan’s Constitution and its international obligations.

© Eurasia Review