Samuel Jardine is a geopolitical consultant specialising in strategic competition and governance, focusing on Space, the Arctic, the Antarctic, and the seabed. He has advised government, UN agency, corporate, and NGO clients globally on major emerging policy areas. He has been invited to lecture at institutions including the Royal College of Defence Studies, Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre, and RUSI alongside appearing in global media. He is currently the Head of Research at London Politica (a geopolitical risk consultancy and think tank), a Senior Advisor at Luminint (a risk intelligence advisory) and a Research Associate for Oxford University and CHACR’s Climate Change & (In)Security Project. He is also the Policy Specialist for the Lunar Policy Platform, a Fellow and Lunar Registry Project Lead for the Open Lunar Foundation, and a Research Affiliate for the Center for Space Governance.

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Alongside this, Sam has a freelance consultant practice aligned with the International Peace and Security Network, and is a Consultant for RUSI’s Defence, Industries and Societies programme as well as Mabway. Formally, Sam was the Project Manager for Lord Kerslake’s Independent cross-bench Commission in UK Military Accommodation and was a Consultant for RUSI’s Defence, Industries and Society Program. He has held Research Fellowships with the Foresight Institute, Open Lunar Foundation, Center for Space Governance, the Arctic Institute, Ecologic Institute and MiH-RCN Arctic Geopolitics programme. Sam holds an MA in Modern History from King’s College London, a BA(Hons) in History from the Open University and was a RUSI Military Sciences “Rising Stars” mentee.

Where do you see the most exciting research/debates happening in your field?

Given that my field, frontier geopolitics, covering Space, Arctic, Antarctic, and Seabed, are all very new in terms of having increasing geopolitical competition impacting their status quo and indeed, in many cases actually being responsible for facilitating them! It is here that the exciting, terrifying, and sometimes existential debates are taking place. The current global landscape has meant that there are now fewer certainties than ever before, making forecasting and risk analysis more important than ever and helping to drive a resurgence in Applied History- one of my favoured methodologies.

We are in a period of intense political polarisation. Multilateralism and international law are going through a recession in favour of sovereign interest and escalating competition, globalisation is not backsliding, but shifting into “blocification” due to geopolitical, security and domestic political concerns. Populist politics globally appears to be taking hold as a backlash against the negative aspects of a global world economy. Despite this, the world is more connected than ever, courtesy of social media and the internet. However, for how long that lasts long term, there is an ongoing debate about the potential regionalisation of the web. It is a time of rapid change where policy tools thought in the West as “outdated” such as peer/near-peer warfare are seemingly back on the menu as ways of pursuing foreign policy objectives.

In between all of this, we still, however, need to come together to solve increasingly pressing transboundary and global issues- most existential of all being mitigating, or potentially adapting, to the consequences of climate change. In all these contexts, the polar regions, space, and seabed feature prominently as the areas that may both ensure humanity’s future but also are the new emerging arenas in which multipolar geopolitical competition is playing out.

How has the way you understand the world changed over time, and what (or who) prompted the most significant shifts in your thinking?

I have had the (mis?)fortune to grow upright on the cusp of this sea change. So, I think my understanding of the world has shifted from a fairly straight-forward late-90s/early 2000s perspective that globalisation and international institutions are concepts that are built on bedrock, to understanding their fragility in the face of emerging powers who feel they do not fairly suit them. It has made me appreciate both the benefits and advantages of current governance systems, but also the negatives they have or can cause for segments of humanity. I also have been surprised by, but now understand that existential risk is not actually a significant unifier for humanity. Whether it be dealing with climate change, nuclear competition, or a Kessler Syndrome event cutting off our access to orbits- that alone is usually not enough for actors to cooperate and put aside their competitive aims, at least not until the issue is staring them right in the face and its likely too late to do any significant mitigation by then.

This has not been a depressing lesson though, more a realisation that we all need to do better at incentivising differing actors and understanding their motivations. Now I explore how we can make better, more mutually beneficial multilateral governance arrangements in key existential areas or geopolitical arenas - how we can keep multipolar geopolitical competition productive and restrain its excesses, adapt to a multipolar world, and what actually drives actors in their policy aims. In doing this, it is important to “get out of my bubble” and actually talk with and learn from these actors and stakeholders with no judgment. It is about understanding that country Y in West Africa does not want to be told they need to ensure their future planned space operations are sustainable from an environmental perspective, but instead, be pitched that it is a sensible economic decision that improves long-term efficiency. It is about not getting bogged down in what might be called performative political polarisation and ensuring actionable progress happens on the key issues that build relationships, cooperation, and understanding between all parties.

With the growing influence of Russia, China, and the BRICS countries in the Arctic, how do you think the Arctic Council can adapt to these shifting geopolitical dynamics? What role do you see it playing in managing security and diplomatic challenges in the region?

Broadly, the Arctic Council’s ability to manage geopolitical and security challenges is inherently limited, leaving it ill-equipped to navigate a 21st-century Arctic that has become one of the key emerging arenas of geopolitical competition. While it will likely retain influence in niche but critical areas such as environmental governance, economic development, and scientific cooperation, at least for half the region, it is increasingly being sidelined in broader Arctic affairs because it does not have the mandate or capacity to tackle the interwoven security elements that have been developing in the region since 2008. If the global shift toward sovereignty-first governance over multilateralism continues, the Council’s role in shaping Arctic diplomacy will only further diminish.

Three key reasons are driving this for the Arctic. Firstly, global interest in the region from influential non-Arctic states will strain the Arctic Council as a forum and convener. With only half the Arctic in its remit, it can be more easily sidelined, especially as non-Arctic states seek to have a great say in Arctic affairs, highlighting their interests being based on the Arctic’s key role in climate change, and the impacts it has on their environmental systems. Secondly, the Arctic Council was already unable to adapt to a geopolitical environment that saw security concerns, that its mandate restricted it from covering, increasingly becoming key aspects in a multipolar world, to the issues it did cover, such as science diplomacy, economic development, and sustainability. Lastly, the concept of “One Arctic”, which was the core of the Arctic Council, is gone with geopolitical competition effectively splitting the region into two competing spheres: one dominated by NATO-aligned states and the other by Russia. Many of the key Arctic issues, such as climate change, environmental protection, and economic development, were transboundary. Without half of the Arctic in its remit, the effectiveness of its efforts and its influence is significantly diminished.

It is perhaps important to note here (as a caveat), that even if a Trump administration promotes the reintegration of Russia into the G7 and this translates down the line to Russia re-joining the Arctic Council a lot of the above geopolitical issues, particularly the split of the Arctic into two with diverging security, regulatory and geopolitical approaches will remain, as will the Arctic Council’s inability to deal with a geopolitically competitive landscape that sees security and geopolitical issues tied to, and inform its mandated interests- it would still be trying to operate with one arm tied behind its back.

This is not to say that the Arctic Council will be entirely sidelined, as it may remain a key forum for NATO-aligned Arctic states, maintaining relevance over just under 50% of the region. Its work in environmental protection, scientific diplomacy, and indigenous representation could also allow for limited engagement with Russian counterparts in the future, particularly on specific transboundary issues. However, even this role comes with risks. Trump 2.0 has already strained NATO Arctic cohesion through aggressive security posturing and controversial Greenland-related policies including a bill by Republican lawmakers to facilitate negotiations for Greenland to join the US, even proposing to rename it in official US designations as "Red, White, and Blue-land", a move that has caused diplomatic tensions with both Greenland and Denmark.

However, since the Arctic Council lacks a mandate to address political or security disputes, its ability to de-escalate tensions would be severely limited. If a future US administration chooses to escalate Arctic sovereignty disputes, such as the longstanding US-Canada disagreement over the Northwest Passage, the Council would remain a bystander rather than a mediator, further highlighting its diminishing role in Arctic governance.

Given the rise in Arctic shipping traffic and Russia's shift away from Arctic Council cooperation in favour of partnerships with non-Arctic states, what security risks and diplomatic implications should states consider in preparing for future challenges, especially in contested areas like the Northern Sea Route (NSR)?

There are two key interwoven factors here. First, misunderstanding and misconstruing states' intentions is the biggest security risk. The Arctic is evolving into a classic security dilemma due to the lack of multilateral dialogue and the increasing interest of non-Arctic actors. The only real messaging that now happens in the region between competing actors is military due to the absence of dialogue. Second, the biggest diplomatic implication linked to this is strategic in nature. This being that states need to start thinking vertically – i.e., for all states, the Greenland-Icelandic-UK gap (GIUK Gap) becomes important once more. China as a naval power is very different to the former USSR- it is seeking to build a comprehensive blue water navy that can operate globally, rather than focusing on a largely asymmetrical maritime doctrine of regional defence and disruption. China’s significant investment in Russia’s claimed NSR can, through a certain lens, be seen as an enabler of this alongside its economic and political goals for Beijing. China does not want to be cut out of any Arctic highway, or have its access blocked by NATO states, so the GIUK Gap revitalises its NATO Cold War role as a preventative chain to survey and potentially block competitors entering the North Atlantic area.

States need to become comfortable with an Arctic that is reconceptualised as an accessible maritime bridge, rather than its historic formulation as a barrier for power projection and access. These issues come together in the situation surrounding the NSR, which is currently one of the Arctic’s most likely crisis flashpoints.

However, Moscow’s perception of the NSR has changed dramatically away........

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