For the past two decades, the Democratic Party has struggled to articulate a coherent US foreign policy doctrine. From the Iraq War to the rise of China to the Russia-Ukraine war, the Democrats have had little exciting to offer. Too often, they have converged with the Republicans on militarism, occasionally tinging it with a dose of liberal internationalism in an effort – often fruitlessly – to demonstrate that they are different. That uninspiring foreign policy may finally be facing a serious reform movement in the wake of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As the Democratic establishment once again turns to militarism to defend the US-Israel alliance, insurgent progressives – once on the fringes of the Party – are gaining momentum to reverse that tradition. This could evolve into a broader challenge to the party’s establishment, and ultimately rescue the Democrats from their disappointing record.

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Democrats once knew how to do foreign policy. Those who succeeded connected their foreign-policy principles to their domestic agenda. In doing so, they created a coherent foreign-policy philosophy that could resonate with mainstream voters, who generally care more about domestic affairs than foreign policy. Woodrow Wilson framed American entry into World War I and the creation of the League of Nations in terms of protecting American security and prosperity. Likewise, the Franklin D. Roosevelt presented his recognition of the Soviet Union as part of a broader effort to advance American economic interests during the Great Depression. Jimmy Carter framed nuclear arms control with the Soviets as a means of reducing the economic burdens of the arms race and preserving resources for domestic priorities. Bill Clinton presented China’s accession to the WTO as an opportunity to expand American exports, create jobs, and strengthen the U.S. economy. That foreign-domestic policy nexus, nevertheless, largely disappeared.

When Democrats rallied behind John Kerry in 2004, they hoped that his military service in Vietnam and his vote authorizing the Iraq War would give him the credentials to challenge George W. Bush as an accredited commander in chief. But they overlooked Kerry’s internally contradictory foreign-policy record. He supported several U.S. military interventions while remaining committed to multilateralism. The result was that Kerry, the liberal hawk, alienated anti-war voters without giving hawkish voters a compelling reason to prefer him over Bush. More importantly, in their effort to portray Kerry as a strong strategist, Democrats failed to answer the question that mattered most to their own base: How would a Democratic president with an inclination toward Republican-style military intervention make Americans better off?

The Kerry puzzle seems to have haunted the Democratic foreign-policy agenda ever since, with occasional exceptions. Barack Obama had some notable foreign policy achievements, such as the Iran nuclear deal and the normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations. And those achievements suggested that he had the potential to reform, if not transform, the rigid Democratic foreign policy orthodoxy. But the unexpected rise of Donald Trump abruptly brought that process to a halt in 2016,........

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