The war in Ukraine is halfway through its fifth year and shows little sign of resolution. The Trump-initiated peace talks have failed, and at the time of writing, Vladimir Putin is allegedly considering full conscription to boost the size of the Russian army. It is instructive, in seeking the causes of the war, to focus on the Russian media a few months before the invasion took place, i.e., from January to December 2021, and early 2022. The media reflects the views of the Russian government and highlights the narratives the latter deems as most important for the public to hear. During the Putin presidency, and particularly after the start of his third term in 2012, the authorities have restricted independent reporting, and as during Soviet times, the media—and now social media—have become propaganda organs for the government.

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Focus on the months before the wider invasion of Ukraine is instructive in determining the motives of the Russian leaders for invading Ukraine. Two themes are immediately evident. The first is the focus on the Great Patriotic War (hereafter GPW). The second feature is the emphasis on Russian youth and their desires and motivations. Let us examine each in turn and then assess their contemporary relevance and links.

The Great Patriotic War

The media highlights anniversaries, such as the Siege of Leningrad, the Battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, and the Nuremberg Trials, but they also make a direct comparison with the war in Ukraine. For example, as February 2021 marked the anniversary of the “Road of Life,” which brought food to the besieged city of Leningrad, the Chair of Russia’s Federation Council, Valentina Matviyenko went to the city to honour those who had fallen. Though the Nazis had tried to destroy the city, she said, “Hunger, cold, and daily bombings did not break the supreme moral strength of Leningraders. We will always remember this heroic deed.”

As part of a project on the Day of Remembrance, the Archives of St. Petersburg Project published declassified photographs on their portal. The official date of the commemoration was 8 September. The crucial question is why Stalin allowed the city to starve because of his deep suspicions of enmity toward his leadership, but it is never explored.

Further, the antagonists are transformed into contemporary examples. The Red Army of 1941-45 is the Russian army of today; the Nazis are the Ukrainians, and their reported masters are the West and NATO. Moreover, there are no obvious breaks despite the passage of time. The claim is that the GPW has never ended; it is simply extended to the present. According to Russian philosopher Aleksandr Dugin, the Special Military Operation is a continuation of the Great Patriotic War; in the present, as in the past, people are fighting “against a dark force that has engulfed Europe and was preparing to engulf the whole world.” The analogy is repeated across Russia in various forms. In some schools, soldiers participating in the war in Ukraine give talks in schools about the Great Patriotic War to engender concern among schoolchildren for both events, which are perceived as largely synonymous, however far-fetched that may appear to a Western observer.

Hence, on 28 January 2022, just over three weeks before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, RIA Novosti recalled the Kyiv trial 75 years earlier, of 12 Nazis tried and hanged in the central square of the city for war crimes. Yet the current Ukrainian authorities, the article noted, are revering Banderites (followers of the nationalist leader Stepan Bandera) whose atrocities during the war exceeded even those of the Nazis. In Ukraine, however, it is claimed, a generation has grown up that does not consider the GPW as part of its heritage.

Ukraine and the Baltic States

Hence, the neighbouring states in this period are saying very different things. Latvia opted to ban the ribbon of St. George, widely used by the Russian army. In this way, according to the Russian media, the Latvians continue to honour pro-Nazi units in various ways. In August 2022, Estonia announced its intention to remove Soviet monuments from public places. It marked a sequel to a controversial decision in 2007 to remove the “Bronze Soldier of........

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