Eight Experts on What You’re Not Being Told about the War in Iran |
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Eight Experts on What You’re Not Being Told about the War in Iran
The questions that aren’t making it into the battlefield dispatches
War reporting has its value. It tells us what was hit and by whom, how the strikes played out, the tactical gains and setbacks. But that is only the first draft of events. The situation in Iran demands more than a battlefield ledger. The harder questions go deeper. Which assumptions—about deterrence, regime durability, regional alliances, or constraints of law—might be wrong?
Over the past couple days, The Walrus has spoken with Middle East and foreign policy experts about where they see the greatest risks of escalation. What alarms them most looking ahead? What is missing from the current coverage? What absolutely needs to be part of the public debate right now?
Their responses follow, edited for length and clarity.
“Gulf states, already uneasy, have been forced into a strategic dilemma.” Pierre Pahlavi Full Professor, Chair of the Department of Security and International Affairs, and Deputy Director in the Department of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto
The temptation in moments like this is to measure escalation by visible firepower: missile ranges, troop movements, the opening—or avoidance—of a second front in Lebanon. But the most dangerous phase of this crisis may not be geographic expansion. It may be structural destabilization.
Much of the coverage treats the conflict as a conventional military exchange between Israel, the United States, and Iran. That framing misses two critical dynamics.
First, Iran was never designed to win a conventional war against a superpower. Its doctrine is asymmetrical. Ballistic missiles reaching 2,000 kilometres make for dramatic headlines, but Tehran’s real leverage lies in calibrated disruption: cyber operations, maritime insecurity in the Gulf, proxy ambiguity, and energy market shockwaves. If escalation comes, it is more likely to unfold in the grey zone than through a direct strike on North America.
Second, there is a growing risk of horizontal escalation—drawing in regional actors not because they seek war but because they are within range. Gulf states, already uneasy, have been forced into a strategic dilemma. European allies providing defensive support may find themselves redefined as co-belligerents. An expanding coalition changes the conflict’s logic. It dilutes pressure on Tehran in one sense—but also raises the stakes for everyone.
What concerns me most is not immediate regime collapse in Iran, nor a sudden regional war, but a grinding destabilization: energy volatility, cyber disruption, miscalculation among overstretched militaries, and a public debate fixated on spectacle rather than systemic risk. The question is not how far missiles can fly. It is how far instability can spread—and how quickly.
“The real test now is turning tactical dominance into strategic success.” Thomas Juneau Professor at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and an Associate Fellow with Chatham House
In the first hours and days of their war against the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel and the US have scored major tactical gains. They have decapitated the regime’s leadership, established near complete control of Iran’s airspace, and significantly degraded its military assets. Israel and the United States have again demonstrated an extraordinary intelligence penetration of the highest levels of the Islamic Republic. At the same time, Iranian retaliation has only caused limited damage. Overall, this should not come as a surprise given the massive military imbalance in favour of the US and Israel.
The real test now is turning tactical dominance into strategic success. And here, the challenges become far more difficult, and the perspective for success murkier—at best.
If the strikes continue for weeks and the regime falls, what then? There is no opposition, democratic or otherwise, ready to take over. There is also no indication that the Trump administration has a serious plan for what comes next. Chaos and prolonged instability are therefore the most likely scenario. This would inevitably spill over across Iran’s borders, threatening its neighbours.
Should President Trump follow through on his offer to resume negotiations with the Islamic Republic’s new, interim leadership, the regime would likely survive. It would not be the same; it would be weaker but also nastier. It would still be able to brutally suppress nascent protests, since it would retain extensive repressive capacity. While Washington........