In the final days of 2025, hundreds of thousands of desperate demonstrators took to the streets across Iran to protest against the regime. They were protesting poor economic conditions, unemployment, the regime’s brutality, and above all, the absence of hope that has characterized recent years in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

US President Donald Trump, briefed by close associates and others, saw in these events a major opportunity: He promised the protesters that help was on the way, and two months later, together with Israel, launched a military operation against Iran.

On the first day of the war, Trump expressed hope that after the intense phase of the fighting, the protesters would be able to topple the regime. About a week after the outbreak of the war, Senator Lindsey Graham estimated that the regime would fall within two weeks.

For now, the US is not preparing for a ground invasion and is continuing, together with Israel, to pound the Iranian regime from the air, in the hope that the brutal, corrupt regime, hated by a large part of its own people, will be weakened enough to collapse in one way or another.

But a look at the history of authoritarian regimes around the world indicates that this wishful thinking does not necessarily come true, even under the harshest conditions. The cases of Iraq and Syria show that even a terrible economic situation, brutal repression, and heavy military blows do not necessarily bring down regimes, at least not immediately.

Authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, Europe, and Latin America did collapse when several conditions were met — conditions that do not necessarily exist in Iran today. So what needs to happen in Iran for the Islamic Republic to breathe its last and make way for a different Iran?

The regime’s great test: Military loyalty

On April 8, 2003, Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf, Iraq’s information minister, gave an interview to Abu Dhabi TV and declared that Iraqi forces had succeeded in driving American soldiers away from the area of Baghdad International Airport. “We have cleaned the entire area around the airport,” al-Sahhaf said.

After the interview, the channel broadcast images from Baghdad airport, where American forces were clearly in control and not a single Iraqi soldier could be seen.

The cases of Iraq and Syria show that even a terrible economic situation, brutal repression, and heavy military blows do not necessarily bring down regimes, at least not immediately

The cases of Iraq and Syria show that even a terrible economic situation, brutal repression, and heavy military blows do not necessarily bring down regimes, at least not immediately

The following day, Baghdad finally fell and the Iraqi regime collapsed. The Iraqi army crumbled during the first three weeks of fighting, as many soldiers abandoned their battalions, changed into civilian clothes, and returned home.

Even the Republican Guard, which continued fighting in several locations, failed to establish defensive lines. Only militias personally loyal to Saddam Hussein, such as the Fedayeen Saddam, gave everything they had and fought fiercely against the Americans.

What caused the Iraqi army to fall so quickly? It had been exhausted by the endless war with Iran, then by the failed invasion of Kuwait, by sanctions, by Saddam Hussein’s brutal purges, and by a sense of futility and hopelessness.

The Iraqi writer Ghaith Abdul-Ahad wrote in his book “A Stranger in Your Own City” about the corruption that had spread through the country and left no decent part untouched: “Corruption gnawed at the state and turned it into an empty shell, devoid of legitimate authority and unworthy of respect. When a teacher’s salary fell to a dollar, and a policeman’s to five dollars, when pilots and tank commanders were forced to work as taxi drivers to supplement their income, corruption and embezzlement became a way of life.”

In Syria, too, in December 2024, the army disintegrated and surrendered to the rebels led by Ahmad al-Sharaa. This was preceded by years of civil war, forced conscription, and extremely harsh economic conditions among the regime’s soldiers.

In Libya, where Muammar Gaddafi relied on mercenaries out of fear of a rebellion emerging from within the army, there was ultimately no one left to defend him. In Portugal, army officers and generals dissatisfied with the policies of Antonio Salazar and his successor Marcelo Caetano — who had waged bloody wars in Africa — launched the “Carnation Revolution,” which won broad support from the masses.

The picture in Iran today looks different. The Iranian regime, itself a corrupt one, still managed over the years to look after its loyalists — members of the security forces, bureaucrats, and businesspeople close to power.

Iran has frequently intervened in the conflicts of others, but has avoided war on its own soil since the 1980s, following the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Despite sanctions, it built a relatively stable isolationist economy and became a regional power of significance.

Is the Iranian army distinct from the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij, and is there a chance it might side with demonstrators when they once again find the courage to take to the streets?

Nikita Smagin, an Iran expert working from Azerbaijan and the author of the book “Iran for........

© The Times of Israel