Netanyahu Can Lose and Still Win
Israel is approaching the October 27 election under conditions of unusual political uncertainty. Likud is under pressure, Netanyahu has no guaranteed path to a majority, and the governing bloc depends on partners whose interests are increasingly difficult to reconcile. At the same time, the West Bank is becoming more volatile: settler violence is intensifying, Palestinian communities are under growing pressure, and politicians on the Israeli right are trying to consolidate territorial and institutional changes before the election. The temptation is to ask whether Netanyahu wants another intifada. But the more disturbing possibility is that escalation may matter less because it could save Netanyahu personally than because it can determine the political field in which even his opponents are forced to compete.
The serious question is therefore not whether one politician secretly desires escalation. There is no basis for claiming that Netanyahu is planning an intifada. The more useful question is what happens when several political actors, for different reasons, discover that escalation serves them better than restraint. Smotrich needs the settler right and is fighting for political survival. Ben-Gvir needs confrontation because confrontation is not merely one of his themes; it is his natural habitat. The settler movement needs time, territorial momentum and facts that become harder to reverse. Netanyahu needs a viable right-wing bloc and eventually 61 seats. No conspiracy is required. Alignment is enough.
If settler pressure increases, if enforcement remains selective, if Palestinian communities react, and if that reaction is then presented as proof that the original security narrative was correct, an efficient political loop appears. Provocation produces reaction, reaction produces evidence, evidence justifies control, and control produces further reaction. Everyone can then claim to be merely responding to the previous stage. Responsibility circulates, while political utility remains remarkably stable.
What makes this more than an abstract scenario is that the security establishment itself is warning about the danger. According to recent reporting, senior IDF officials have warned that the West Bank is approaching a point at which continued settler violence, illegal outposts and weak enforcement could trigger a broader Palestinian response. That matters because it identifies the mechanism without requiring speculation about secret intentions. The risk is not simply that violence exists, but that........
