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How is it possible that Viktor Orban was voted out after 16 years in power in Hungary, and his rival, Péter Magyar, won by such a large margin that he can even make constitutional changes to restore checks and balances to the country’s governing system?
After all, we have heard time and again that Hungary is no longer democratic. So how is it possible that the government was replaced, perhaps even without unrest?
This is precisely the sentiment that supporters of the coalition in Israel have been trying to amplify since the results of the elections were announced. MK Simcha Rothman wrote: “A bunch of lunatics shouted here in the streets for a year that the judicial reform would destroy democracy in Israel and that we would soon become Hungary. And today we discovered that in Hungary it is possible to replace the ‘dictator’ through democratic elections.”
Prof. Yuval Elbashan wrote: “It will be interesting to see how our constitutional clerics will explain to their flock tomorrow the news from Hungary – that the terrible dictatorship simply… fell at the ballot box?… What luck that Hungary forgot to read the opinions of our experts who roared that it was over, that this was the end of democracy.”
These are straw-man attacks. No serious scholar has thought or claimed that Hungary is a dictatorship in the literal sense – an absolute authoritarian regime – but rather that it is a country undergoing significant democratic erosion, carried out gradually and sometimes imperceptibly, yet one that still leads to substantial decay in core components: competitive and equal elections, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. At its peak, such erosion can lead to a fundamental transformation of the regime from a liberal democracy to a non-liberal one, as has occurred in Hungary.
It is important to understand in this context that Orban has won past elections not only due to popularity or a successful campaign, but primarily due to a systematic reshaping of the democratic rules of the game that ensured him a persistent structural advantage.
Orban’s structural advantages
Elections in Hungary are not rigged in the classic sense. They take place and may be free in the sense that every citizen can vote, but they are not fair, because the electoral rules themselves are biased. Over time, a system emerged in which even when the opposition unites and gains significant support (as in previous elections), it is difficult for it to win, because even a relative majority of votes can translate into a large majority of seats (as previously occurred with Fidesz and now with Tisza), and the system preemptively neutralized various opposition strategies.
Orban’s Hungary exemplifies a model of using constitutional and electoral tools – such as gerrymandering (redistricting), and granting voting rights to Hungarians abroad who tend to support Orban at very high rates – in order to make elections less fair without formally abolishing them.
And of course, alongside this, Orban has near-complete control over the institutional media. The billboards are his, Fidesz has made extensive use of state resources for election campaigning, and state institutions have echoed his campaign messages. Elections are formally free, but not equal in conditions. Orban built a system that created a structural advantage that is almost impossible to overcome. It is important to stress – only almost – because with sufficiently strong support for the opposition, victory is still possible.
By way of comparison, if this were a football match, for years Orban’s opponents played with nine players while he appointed the referee. This does not predetermine the winner, but it creates extremely difficult conditions for the opponent. Yet with enough determination and will, even a structurally disadvantaged rival can win, as just happened in Hungary.
Young voters make history
A combination of circumstances led to extraordinary support for Magyar: the severe economic situation, partly caused by the suspension of European Union funds due to Orban’s policies; deep corruption and failed appointments based solely on loyalty rather than professionalism, leading to systemic breakdowns; a young right-wing candidate – flesh of Fidesz’s flesh – who “turned” against the system; and what ultimately ensured success was the withdrawal of other opposition parties, leaving the field to a single candidate to face Orban head-on.
A public weary of what Magyar calls a “mafia state” turned out in large numbers and chose change. The ace in the hole was the younger generation – those who, as in Israel, do not remember another prime minister and struggle to imagine one – who flocked to the polls and voted in particularly high turnout in an effort to secure a better future.
It is important to remember that Magyar is probably not a great liberal. During the campaign, he avoided addressing controversial liberal issues that might have been difficult to sell to voters. This likely worked to his advantage. Hungarians understood that first and foremost, it was necessary to win the election and remove Orban, and that Magyar could be the key to change.
In his victory speech, he said: “Our institutions have been captured over the past 16 years. We will restore checks and balances to Hungary.” He also called for the resignation of the president, the president of the Supreme Court, the prosecutor general, the head of the Media Authority, and the head of the Competition Authority, stating: “Those who deceived our country will be held accountable.” They failed in their duties, did not act as gatekeepers, and allowed corruption to flourish.
For the thousands of young people who flooded the streets of Budapest that night, it was a historic moment. Many of those I spoke with said that if Orban had won, they would have left Hungary. There was a spark in their eyes, and all expressed cautious optimism that perhaps now, repair might begin. For older generations, it was a moment reminiscent of the revolutionary transition from communism to democracy in 1989. And those who have struggled for democracy for 16 years now hope for democratic recovery.
There is also a possibility that Orban’s fall – following the fall of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil – marks a significant domino in the decline of populist regimes.