History occasionally produces events that overturn the intellectual frameworks used to interpret the modern world. The French Revolution did this in 1789 by demonstrating the political power of mass mobilization, and the Russian Revolution did it again in 1917 by introducing an ideological state built on Marxism. Yet the Iranian Revolution of 1979 posed a challenge even more unsettling to modern assumptions. It had become a modernizing state that many believed was steadily moving toward secular development, given Peter Burger’s at that time on the secularization thesis, which he later rejected. It argued that as societies modernize, religion gradually loses social, political, and cultural influence.

Yet, suddenly, Iran produced a theocratic government led by clerics. For many scholars and policymakers, the outcome seemed almost inconceivable beforehand, given its shift to a more secularized government. The shock was not simply political; it was intellectual as well. The Iranian Revolution revealed a blind spot in modern political theory: the enduring political power of religion.

Prior to the revolution of 1979, most academic work, led by Burger, which was built upon the work of Max Weber and Émile Durkheim, assumed that modernization caused religion to retreat from politics as secular regimes rose to power. Industrialization, urbanization, and advances in education pushed religion away from the public sphere and toward private life. Indeed, Iran appeared to be heading in this direction under the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah, whose regime was committed to economic modernization and an alliance with the West. Industrial growth, land reform, and the increasing importance of the state bureaucracy all suggested that Iran was well on its way to becoming a modern secular nation-state. In theory, all these developments should have pushed religion to the sidelines. Yet, in Iran, modernization actually contributed to the politicization of religion.

Many analysts misunderstood the revolution because they relied on assumptions shaped by Europe’s own historical experience. These assumptions were rarely examined closely. The prevailing belief was that modernization would result in secularization, urbanization would give rise to liberal political movements, education would undermine religious authority, and economic development would foster political moderation. Iran defied all of those expectations. Urbanization empowered the organizing networks of mosques; education begot political students who used moral and religious language to frame their dissent; and economic development led to increasing inequality and a weakened legitimacy for the monarchy. What appeared contradictory to outside observers were in fact all forces coalescing in the same direction within Iranian society. The issue was not just that experts failed to anticipate events. More fundamentally, many failed to recognize the structural role religion could play in modern political change.

Historian Abbas Amanat has argued that the revolution cannot be understood as a sudden explosion in 1978 and 1979. It did not happen in a vacuum. Instead, it was the result of a long historical process defined by the interplay between religious and political authority in Iran. Since the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911, Iran had operated under a weak dual system of legitimacy: the monarchy wielded political power, but the Shi‘ite clergy commanded great moral authority in society. Accordingly, there was ongoing tension between a centralized state and independent religious scholars. Reza Shah’s rule in the 1920s and 1930s diminished the power of the clergy while building up the state, and his son’s modernization efforts with the White Revolution programs in the 1960s brought about rapid social change and heightened conflict with the clerical establishment. In this sense, the revolution was not the origin of the conflict, but rather its culmination.

The clerical establishment survived these waves of modernization partly because it operated largely outside the state. Governments rose and fell, but networks of mosques, seminaries, charitable foundations, and systems of religious taxation continued to function across Iranian society. These institutions maintained independent authority and deep legitimacy among merchants, urban communities, and rural populations alike. By the 1970s, the monarchy was losing credibility among many segments of society. The clerical system, by contrast, remained intact. When the political order began to unravel, authority did not disappear into a vacuum. It flowed toward institutions that had preserved their independence for generations.

The Shah’s modernization program also produced social forces that would later challenge his rule. Land reforms disrupted rural life and drove large numbers of people into rapidly expanding cities. Changes to the educational system turned out more students imbued with new ideas but devoid of political outlets. Meanwhile, the regime’s increasing use of secret police and arbitrary rule caused disaffection among intellectuals, clerics, and the bazaar class. As opposition mounted, the clergy emerged as one of the few groups able to connect the many disaffected segments of society. Mosques provided an effective network for communication that was relatively immune to state control. Religious festivals and martyrdom days provided occasion for repeated mass gatherings. What appeared sudden in 1978 was actually the outcome of decades of social and political change.

The decisive factor in the revolution was the structural power of Shi‘ite religious institutions. For centuries the Shi‘ite ‘ulama had established autonomy for themselves in seminaries, mosques, pious foundations, and religious taxes (such as khums). Urban merchants, peripheral villagers, and religious scholars were linked together in a dense social network that mostly existed outside the domain of the state. As the monarchy began to lose legitimacy, the clerical establishment had the mechanisms in place to mobilize a mass movement. Religion did not just provide a motivating ideology; it provided organization. The revolution was played out in the form of sermons, religious meetings, and commemorations, which were already woven into the fabric of daily life. The revolution was not simply a spontaneous uprising; it activated religious structures embedded in Iranian society for centuries.

Beneath this institutional power lay a distinctive theological framework. The s understanding of Shi‘ite Islam teaches that the rightful leader of the Muslim community is the Hidden Imam, believed to be in occultation until his return as the Mahdi who will establish justice on earth. Because the true Imam is absent, earthly political authority is often viewed as provisional and morally questionable. This view had instilled skepticism toward secular authority and reinforced the high moral status of the clerical class. In times of crisis, these ideas facilitated resistance to unjust rule. As a consequence, the revolutionary movement was buttressed not only by social networks, but also by long-standing religious expectations regarding justice and leadership.

Shi‘ite religious symbolism provided the revolutionary movement with a powerful moral vocabulary as well. The foundational event in Shi‘ite collective memory is the martyrdom of Husayn at Karbala, and the story’s central theme is resistance to tyranny. Ayatollah Khomeini invoked this narrative in the context of the anti-regime movement, arguing that resistance to the Shah was an obligation. The monarchy could be depicted as unjust and illegitimate, while the anti-regime movement could be interpreted as a continuation of a much older struggle for justice. Demonstrations thus became not only political acts, but also re-enactments of historical and religious moments. Millions participated not only as citizens angry at their government, but as Shi‘ites emulating the behavior of their role models. Political opposition took on an emotional intensity that purely secular movements rarely achieve.

Shi‘ite theology also places extraordinary emphasis on martyrdom as a witness against injustice. Husayn’s death at Karbala in 680 CE is not simply remembered as a historical event but reenacted each year through rituals of mourning and public lamentation. These commemorations reinforce the belief that standing against tyranny is a moral obligation, even when defeat appears inevitable. During the protests of 1978, this theology shaped how many Iranians understood the unfolding conflict. Deaths at the hands of the regime could be interpreted as martyrdom, strengthening rather than weakening the movement. Each cycle of mourning and commemoration fed the next round of protest. Theology and political mobilization began to reinforce one another.

Ayatollah Khomeini ultimately pushed these theological assumptions in a new direction. According to his doctrine of velayat-e faqih, or the “guardianship of the jurist,” qualified Islamic jurists have authority and a responsibility to rule, even before the return of the Hidden Imam. This represented a major reconceptualization of the role of the clergy. Traditionally, many clerics believed that it was better to advise governments than to rule directly; Khomeini contended that to leave power in the hands of fallible, secular rulers was actually an abdication of religious duty. The Islamic Republic was therefore not only a religious government, but also the embodiment of a new interpretation of religion with regard to government.

The Iranian Revolution also challenged a deeply rooted modern assumption about revolutions themselves. Since the nineteenth century, revolutions have often been interpreted as steps in a broader march toward political freedom and secular democracy. Iran demonstrated that revolutions do not follow such predictable paths.

The revolution challenged academic theories of revolution. Theda Skocpol, a sociologist who had written a highly regarded book called States and Social Revolution about the importance of structural crisis and class conflict, later conceded that Iran “poses important challenges for theories of revolution,” because “one cannot explain this revolution in terms of the break down of the economy or of the administrative and military organizations of the state apparatus.” Ideology, religious authority, and cultural symbolism played decisive roles in mobilizing society. Iran showed that religion could function not merely as background culture but as a central force in revolutionary politics.

Even after the shock of 1979, many analysts still struggle to interpret the Islamic Republic through its own ideological framework. Iran is often described primarily as a conventional nation-state seeking security and regional influence. Those elements certainly exist, but they do not fully capture the regime’s self-understanding. The founders of the Islamic Republic believed they were launching a revolutionary project with broader significance for the Muslim world. Iran’s constitution calls for support of struggles by the oppressed against powerful states. In this vision the revolution was not only a national transformation but the beginning of a wider Islamic awakening. The regime therefore sees itself not simply as a government but as the guardian of an ongoing revolution.

This worldview continues to shape Iranian foreign policy. The Islamic Republic has endured severe economic sanctions without abandoning its ideological commitments. It has also invested resources in supporting allied movements across the Middle East despite economic pressures at home. From a purely geopolitical perspective such choices can appear puzzling. Within the ideological framework of the Islamic Republic, however, they make more sense. Iran’s leaders do not see themselves merely as administrators of a state. They view themselves as custodians of a revolutionary Islamic order whose legitimacy extends beyond national borders.

Much of the continuing Western misinterpretation of Iran reflects the lingering influence of secularization theory. Many policymakers still assume that economic development, generational change, or deeper integration into global markets will gradually normalize Iran’s political system. Yet the revolution itself suggested otherwise. In Iran, modernization strengthened the social networks through which religious leaders organized political resistance. The Islamic Republic therefore represents not simply a temporary deviation from secular modernity but a different model of political modernity in which religious authority remains central.

The Iranian Revolution ultimately forces a broader reconsideration of how political change unfolds in the modern world. Revolutions do not inevitably produce secular or liberal outcomes. Instead, they reveal which institutions command the deepest trust within a society. In Iran, centuries of religious organization prepared the clerical establishment to assume power when the monarchy collapsed. What many observers once viewed as an irrational upheaval can instead be seen as the logical outcome of Iran’s historical structure. The deeper lesson is simple: religion remains one of the most powerful political forces in the modern world. Ignoring that reality will continue to produce misunderstandings about Iran—and about revolutions more broadly.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)