The Hands on Handoff and More Menachos 90-92
90 — How Much Does the Thought Count?
Our Gemara on Amud Beis discusses the various sacrifices which require libations; essentially all of them except for the firstborn offering, the animal tithe offering, the Paschal offering, the sin offering, and the guilt offering, with which libations are not brought.
It is a well-known idea that in a time when the Temple is no longer standing, and one cannot bring sacrifices, the recitation and study of parts of the scripture and Talmud that discuss the laws of sacrifices are considered as if one is bringing a sacrifice (Menachos 110a). This idea is taken so seriously that there is a discussion and debate regarding whether one should say the portion describing the libations after each section, or whether a blanket paragraph covers it all (see Shulchan Aruch, O.C. 65, Magen Avraham, and Pri Megadim).
Related to this, Magen Avraham (beginning of Siman 48, OC) rules that when reciting the liturgy that contains the verses and teachings regarding the sacrifices, one must also stand, because the recitation of the relevant portions is considered a substitute for the Avodah. However, Tevuos Shor (Bechor Shor, Seder Korbanos 12) disputes this requirement. He argues that while the recitation of the relevant verses and teachings is considered as if he brought a sacrifice, the actual recitation is not considered an act of service.
No opinion can hold in an utterly absolute sense that the recitation counts like avodah, because what about being ritually impure or having a blemish—both of which disqualify a Kohen? Furthermore, a non-Kohen is forbidden to perform the Avodah, so how is it permitted for a non-Kohen to recite?
I believe the answer is as follows: Any psul haguf (invalidation due to a physical or material matter) is not considered a problem, since by definition a non-Kohen is performing this substitute service. Impurity, blemishes, and not being of the priestly caste are all physical invalidations and not included in the requirements of this particular substitute sacrificial order. However, standing or not listing the correct combinations of ingredients or libations is not a physical invalidation but rather a flaw in the process, and therefore must be adhered to.
By way of analogy, in Tefillah Zakkah we recite that the fasting on Yom Kippur, and its consumption of the fats and blood volume of our body, should be considered as if we offered the fat and blood of a sacrifice on the altar. Clearly, we are not suggesting that we are literally a sacrifice and subject to all the requirements of sacrifices, such as not being blemished. Rather, we are asking that it count like a sacrifice.
Regardless, at its core, we see a fundamental dispute about whether the recitation and study of the relevant passages of sacrifices are considered, in merit, as if one brought the sacrifice as a substitute process, or are considered as if one is bringing the sacrifice in actuality. Even regarding the earlier quoted section of Tefillah Zakkah, and possibly the recitation of the Akeidah, the same philosophical dispute might apply. Is it considered in merit as if we sacrificed ourselves or our only child (Bereishis 22:12), or as if we actually did it? Similarly, the same dispute might be relevant regarding the teaching in Berachos (6a):
“Rav Ashi said: If a person intended to perform a mitzvah, but due to circumstances beyond his control, he did not perform it, the verse ascribes it as if he performed the mitzvah.”
Is it as if he really performed the mitzvah, or does he merely get credit as if he performed it?
91 — “The In-Between Beast”
Our Gemara on Amud Beis discusses a sheep that is older than a lamb but not quite the age of a ram. This type of animal is called a palges. The Gemara uses a scriptural derivation:
Why do I need the word “or” in the phrase “or for a ram”? The Gemara explains: It serves to include the sacrifice of a palges in the requirement to bring libations. When referring to sheep, the Torah speaks only of lambs and rams. A sheep during its first twelve months is called a lamb, and one older than thirteen months is called a ram. A palges is a sheep in its thirteenth month and is never explicitly mentioned by the Torah. It is therefore necessary to have an independent derivation to teach that if one is sacrificed, libations must be brought with it.
The Gemara goes on to say that we cannot understand the palges as a category of sheep about which we are unsure whether it is considered a lamb or a ram, because why would the verse need to address an unknown? We have a famous principle that a verse never comes to clarify a physically unknown matter, because as far as God is concerned, there are no unknowns. This is simply a lamb or a ram, not both. Therefore, the Gemara says this derivation is according to the opinion that the palges is considered its own form of animal, neither ram nor lamb. Therefore, we need a verse to teach us specifically what rule applies, and the palges is treated like a ram.
The Toras HaOlah (II:20) explains this philosophically. At times, having more of something does not automatically confer additional value. There is a famous principle in the laws of tereifos that an additional organ is rendered as if it is a missing organ. Thus, a five-limbed animal may be as invalid as a three-limbed one, and if it is on the hind legs—which, when missing, render the animal into a tereifa—so too will five legs (Chulin 58b). Here too, a lamb of one year has reached its perfection; if additional time is added, it does not make it more perfect. And it still has not reached the status of a ram, so it is a question that requires a verse to clarify what type of libation to offer.
The idea that when a developmental state is complete there is a certain perfection and stability achieved is also true in human development. For example, right before adolescence, at the edge of latency, many children reach a high degree of social, emotional, and intellectual competence. They now have the confidence to not be as dependent on their parents and to interact with peers in a sophisticated manner. They understand cause and effect, and are capable of moral reasoning. They are doing great until the storm of adolescence comes and knocks them back to the bottom of a long developmental process that brings them fully into adulthood.
Patterns of nature, spirituality, and psychology are often similar because, after all, they were designed by the same Creator. It is important to appreciate that the completion of a particular stage is a plateau and milestone, and upon entering a new stage, often the same challenges and struggles resurface, albeit with greater depth and sophistication. This is why whenever a person moves to a different stage in life, the same traumas and challenges often resurface all over again. Let us imagine a person who conquered their anxiety in late young adulthood. It is very likely that once they marry and enter a new stage, symptoms may resurface or old traumas will be triggered. The same occurs after having a child. Similarly, when older parents marry off their children for the first time and enter into a new phase, this may cause older patterns to resurface. Recognizing this as a truism of human life and psychology allows one to prepare better and feel less defeated if old monsters resurface.
92 — “The Hands on Handoff”
Our Gemara on this amud describes the rules of Semicha, which is a ritual where hands are placed upon the sacrifice, and on which sacrifices it applies. From the process, it seems that it is related to penitence, as it appears to apply to sacrifices that are brought in order to achieve forgiveness or at least closeness to God. For example, communal sacrifices do not require Semicha, except for the scapegoat of Yom Kippur.
There is a discussion regarding whether someone who inherited a sacrifice performs Semicha. However, that does not necessarily indicate that it is not part of penitence, because we do have a concept that an heir can bring about forgiveness for his relative. This is why we give charity on behalf of the deceased (Rokeach Yom Kippur 217, and Beis Yosef and Levush I.C. 621).
Symbolically, it is easy to imagine that there is some kind of transfer by placing the hands on the sacrifice. The idea that hands can effect a transfer is seen elsewhere in Torah belief; for example, Bamidbar 27:23 speaks of Moshe conferring authority upon Yehoshua. The placing of the hands in this case symbolizes a transfer of authority; in the case of a sacrifice, it is a transfer of something else—blame or liability, most likely.
Likkutei Moharan (25:5) adds a dimension to explain this. Sin itself is a result of letting our physical nature dominate our spiritual nature. It is not just that the sin is a physical act of lust, but that our desires for physical gratification and meeting the needs of our body become primary instead of our spiritual yearnings and the need to satisfy our soul. The animal that is being sacrificed is not just taking the punishment for us, so to speak, but also represents our physicality, and we are expunging our physical instincts and gratifications and immediately disposing of them. This is why there is a halachic rule in sacrifices that the slaughtering should happen immediately after the Semicha (Berachos 42a). The power of physicality is constant, and even at the moment that one makes an effort to distance himself from it, it is so susceptible to rationalization and backsliding that the animal must be slaughtered immediately.
This is not the only situation in Halacha where one action must immediately follow another. The Gemara in Berachos (42a) that we just quoted actually lists three such pairs:
“There are three pairs that immediately follow each other: Immediately following placing hands on the head of a sacrifice is its slaughter; immediately following the blessing of redemption recited after Shema is the Amidah prayer; and immediately following the ritual washing of the hands after a meal is the blessing of Grace after Meals. (There is a minority of commentaries who hold it is referring to the washing and blessing at the beginning of the meal.)”
Is there any deeper link between these three pairs, and what is the reason for this requirement?
Recanti (Vayikra 6) says something cryptic:
His sin is transferred to the sacrifice, and we do not want anything to invalidate that sacrifice, so it must be slaughtered immediately. (It seems, according to Recanti, that if the sacrifice became invalidated, the toxic effects of this transferred sin would be released back into the world.) If one says the blessing immediately following the washing, Satan cannot prance about that particular meal. And if one immediately enters Shemoneh Esrei after the blessing of redemption, Satan is denied the ability to prance about for the entire day.
What does any of this really mean? Toras HaOlah (II:22) says that the semicha represents the heavenly flow of blessing, presumably symbolically represented in the placing of hands. Since entropy and decay immediately affect all physical matters from the moment they are granted the spark of existence, the sooner the potential is utilized, the better. The sacrifice, the blessing after washing, and the blessing over redemption prior to Shemoneh Esrei all represent various states of existence: the matter (chomer), the form (tzurah), and the space (he-ader).
The ancients conceptualized all matter as requiring an intellectual design or form to impose its unique pattern of existence upon it—like the software that activates the hardware. Space (he-ader) is the actual field upon which matter exists, and it also needs to be created to allow matter to exist. These three requirements for existence are represented in the three pairs of immediates and need rapid activation to avoid the entropic process of decay that promptly follows.
Which each of the three corresponds to was not made clear by Toras HaOlah, but my guess is that the bestowing of existence upon chomer is represented in semicha on the sacrifice. The bestowing of tzurah is represented by the blessing prior to Shemoneh Esrei, as this is a form of redemption—to be free to find one’s purpose or program. And finally, the washing prior to blessing is the creation of space to allow for the occupation of matter, which is like a blessing over sustenance.
Satan is synonymous with death, decay, and loss of this life force (see Bava Basra 16a and Rasag’s introduction to his commentary on Iyov). So Recanti’s explanation that the execution of the slaughter, prayer, and blessing be immediate lest “Satan prance about” is synonymous with Toras HaOlah’s concern that entropy would disrupt or weaken the life-giving force drawn via these activities and rituals.
Psychologically speaking, delay allows for doubt and ambivalence.
One final thought: The initial powerful and intuitive drive can be watered down by intellectual rationalizations that are not compatible with the passions of a religious emotional act. When it comes to devotional service, overthinking and delay, which sap energy and resolve, do not bring about the best results.
