Iran’s Attacks On Gulf States May Backfire |
Arab Gulf states are shocked and dismayed that they have been continually targeted by Iran during its war with the United States and Israel.
Since its outbreak on February 28, Iran has fired roughly 1,300 ballistic missiles and 2,500 drones at the Persian Gulf. Approximately 60 percent of Iranian projectiles have been aimed at countries there.
Israel has been the object of the remainder of Iran’s attacks.
Beyond striking oil and natural gas fields and refineries, Iran has hit civilian infrastructure such as ports, airports, hotels, and even a desalination plant.
These attacks have caused enormous damage to the economies of Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Oman, all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Qatar has been the worst hit. Its Ras Laffan gas field, the world’s largest, has been so seriously damaged that repairs could take up to five years. Saudi Arabia’s Ras Tanura and Yabu refineries have been struck, as have the United Arab Emirates’ Fujairah oil terminal and the Habshan gas processing terminal. Fires have broken out at Kuwait’s Mina al-Ahmad and Mina al-Abdullah refineries and Bahrain’s Sitra refinery.
Notably, Iran has struck Oman. Missiles have rained down on the ports of Salah and Duqim and the Sohar industrial zone.
Oman had been careful “to balance cooperation with the United States with close relations with Iran,” says Allison Minor of the Atlantic Council. “The Omani approach, colloquially known as ‘friend to all, enemy to none,’ allowed Oman to be a mediator with the Iranians and previously protected the country from the kind of Iranian threats experienced by its neighbors.”
By all accounts, Iran has caused damage to the tune of $200 billion to $400 billion in terms of energy losses and trade disruptions.
The current crisis has been described by the International Energy Agency as “the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market.”
It has led to a scramble for solutions.
The United States has promised to release oil from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which is only 60 percent full. And the US Treasury Department, in a bid to calm markets, has issued licenses for the temporary delivery of heretofore sanctioned Russian and Iranian oil.
The already bad situation may well grow worse.
Yesterday, in a post on X, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, Mohammed Ghalibaf, said that Iran would “irreversibly” demolish energy infrastructure throughout the region if its power plants were attacked. He predicted that energy prices would remain high for a long time.
Ghalibaf issued his warning after US President Donald Trump threatened to bomb Iranian power plants if the strait was not reopened within 48 hours. On March 23, Trump backed down, claiming he had “productive” talks with Iran to end the war. Iran denied that they had taken place.
In the aftermath of Trump’s announcement, crude oil prices dropped after having skyrocketed. On March 21, they closed at around $112 a barrel. (On a personal note, I have keenly felt the effects. Several days ago, in Toronto, I paid $1.70 cents per liter to fill my gas tank. Prior to the war, the average price was $1.30).
Gasoline prices could remain abnormally high if the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the global oil supply passes, remains closed to most shipping. Iran has permitted only a handful of foreign vessels, mainly Indian, Pakistani and Chinese-flagged ships, to get through.
Astonishingly enough, Trump was surprised by Iran’s campaign against the Gulf states. “They (Iran) weren’t supposed to go after all these other countries in the Middle East,” he said. “Nobody expected that. We were shocked.”
He should not have known better.
Trump’s advisors reportedly forewarned him of unintended consequences. And Iranian officials warned the Gulf states that they would be treated as enemies if US forces used their bases, airspace, or territory to attack Iran.
The United States has about a dozen major bases in the Gulf states, almost all of which have apparently been utilized during the war. The Al Udeid base in Qatar, its largest, is the regional headquarters of the US Central Command. Bahrain hosts the US Fifth Fleet. US forces are based in Kuwait’s Ali Al Salam base and the United Arab Emirates’ Al Dafra base.
In addition, the Gulf countries have military partnerships with the United States. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait have been designated as “major non-NATO allies,” while the United Arab Emirates has been labelled as a “major defense partner.”
After Israel bombed Iran’s South Pars gas field, the first targeted attack on its fossil fuel industry, Iran vowed to show “zero restraint” in striking energy infrastructure in the region. True to form, Iran hit the Ras Laffan gas complex in Qatar, the Habshan gas facility in the United Arab Emirates, the Mina al-Ahmadi refinery in Kuwait, and two Saudi oil refineries.
Despite the Gulf states’ security arrangements with the US, they urgently called for a diplomatic solution of the United States’ standoff with Iran over its controversial nuclear program. They argued that the Trump administration’s plan for regime change in Iran was unfeasible. And they feared that Iran might lash out, endangering the foundations of their economies and shattering their image as a haven of stability.
Today, there is a widespread feeling that Iran has crossed “every red line,” says Abdulaziz Sager, the chairman of the Saudi-based Gulf Research Center. “At first we defended them and opposed the war. But once they began directing strikes at us, they became an enemy. There is no other way to classify them.”
The Times of Israel contends that there is a desire among Gulf countries “to ensure that Iran comes out of this war with its military power sufficiently degraded to cease posing a threat to them.”
Mahmoud Khalaf Al-Deiri, a Syrian scholar, thinks that Iran’s attacks will eventually backfire: “One of Tehran’s most significant strategic errors has been antagonizing the Gulf states through direct or indirect attacks, reinforcing the perception that Iran is an unreliable partner. Iran could have pursued a more pragmatic approach, building bridges of trust with its Gulf neighbors and presenting itself as a regional power committed to stability and balance. Instead, it chose to strike Gulf countries or target their security, a move that constitutes a major strategic mistake. This approach has not only expanded the circle of adversaries, but has also pushed Gulf states closer to international alliances, particularly the United States, in search of security guarantees against mounting threats.”
Anwar Gargash, the former foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates — which normalized relations with Israel in 2020 under the Abraham Accords — contends that Iran’s miscalculation has driven the Gulf states closer to Israel and the United States and demonstrated why they cannot accept Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.
“We’re not seeing 2,000 Israeli missiles and drones targeting us,” Gargash said. “We’re seeing 2,000 Iranian missiles and drones targeting us. So for countries that have relations with Israel, this relationship will be strengthened. For countries that don’t have relations, I expect that more channels will be opened.”
Despite Iran’s aggression, Gulf states have so far refused to join the war against Iran. Instead, they have opted for restraint in the hope of preventing a still wider conflict that could further destabilize the region and completely upend global energy markets.
Arab Gulf states face a strategic dilemma. Fawaz Gerges, a scholar at the London School of Economics, thinks they must balance the specter of Iranian attacks against the risk of being sucked into the war.
Saudi Arabia, however, has not ruled out retaliatory strikes. On March 19, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan said, “The kingdom is not going to succumb to pressure. On the contrary, this pressure will backfire … and certainly, as we have stated quite clearly, we have reserved the right to take military actions if deemed necessary.”
Although the Gulf states are well armed, possessing advanced US weapons and aircraft, they have virtually no combat experience in warfare. This factor, in part, accounts for their reliance on diplomacy. As one observer pointed out, the overarching priority of the Gulf Cooperation Council is to avoid getting dragged into a war that is not theirs and that they tried to stop. That being said, they are under mounting pressure to retaliate.
If they launch reprisal raids, the worst-case scenario of a regional Middle East war will most likely materialize, imperiling the flow of oil and gas and undermining the stability of the Gulf states.