Pakistan the broker nobody should trust |
As the anniversary of the Pahalgam attack approaches where Pakistan supported terrorists killed 26 tourists only on the basis of religion in India’s Kashmir region, Pakistan finds itself performing a familiar double act. On one stage, it presents itself as a responsible mediator in one of the most dangerous crises in the Middle East, attempting to broker dialogue between Iran and the United States. On another, it remains entangled in the unresolved shadow of cross-border militancy in Kashmir, where India continues to hold it accountable for the 2025 killings in Pahalgam. The contradiction is structural.
Pakistan’s emergence as a broker in the Iran crisis, much as a key US partner in the Bush led War against terror 25 years ago, has been greeted in some quarters with great skepticism. Islamabad has hosted talks, facilitated backchannel communication, and even helped secure a fragile ceasefire between Washington and Tehran. Asim Munir, the country’s army chief, has been at the centre of this effort, leveraging ties across Washington, Riyadh and Tehran to position Pakistan as a conduit of dialogue walking a delicate balance, one day among the faithful Sunni’s another with the Chinese.
Yet the very structure of this mediation reveals its limits. Pakistan is not an impartial actor. It is a state balancing incompatible strategic dependencies. First given its systemic hate for Israel, the anti-semitism deobandi madrassa’s and other sects such as Tehreek e Labbaik have spread in the country, among the common man and the elite. In its quest to achieve leadership of the umma, to even matter in the order of islamic countries, it has forgotten its pre-partition Indian heritage of tolerance, long Jewish presence and joined the extremist muslim countries which hate Israel.
It maintains a security partnership with Saudi Arabia, a complex border relationship with Iran, and a long history of alignment with the United States. Its role is therefore not that of a neutral broker but of a tactical intermediary, useful for passing messages but incapable of shaping outcomes. It shares the problem of Baluchistan with Iran and Afghanistan, with the separatist Balochi’s trying to create a unified state where they count for the largest and potentially richest land mass. Here Iran has great influence on Pakistan’s security, keeping it hostage.
That limitation was visible in the collapse of the Islamabad talks. After hours of negotiation, fundamental differences between Iran and the United States remained unresolved. Pakistan could convene, transmit, and delay. It could not compel.
This is not a new pattern. Pakistan has long sought diplomatic relevance through mediation, particularly when its own regional standing is under strain. The logic is straightforward. By inserting itself into crises beyond its immediate geography, Islamabad attempts to reframe its global image from that of a security problem to that of a solution provider. But this strategy repeatedly collides with the country’s internal contradictions.
The Pahalgam attack sits at the centre of that contradiction. The killing of civilians in Kashmir in 2025 triggered a sharp escalation between India and Pakistan, with New Delhi attributing responsibility to cross-border networks linked to Pakistan. Islamabad denied involvement and called for an independent investigation, but the broader pattern of militancy and denial has defined the bilateral relationship for decades.
As the anniversary returns, the issue is not simply attribution. It is credibility. A state accused, repeatedly, of tolerating or enabling non-state actors cannot simultaneously claim the moral authority required to mediate conflicts elsewhere. The gap between these roles is too wide to ignore.
This is where Pakistan’s internal dynamics become decisive. The country’s foreign policy is not driven solely by its civilian leadership but is deeply shaped by its military establishment. The same institution that now projects itself as a peacemaker abroad has historically pursued asymmetric strategies in its immediate neighborhood. That duality is not accidental. It reflects a security doctrine that distinguishes between theaters rather than applying a consistent principle.
In the Iran case, Pakistan seeks stability. A wider regional war would threaten its borders, its energy security, and its already fragile economy. In Kashmir, however, instability has often been seen as leverage. The result is a foreign policy that is situational rather than principled, adaptive rather than coherent.
The contrast is therefore not surprising. It is predictable.
There is also a deeper geopolitical irony. Iran itself has, at times, attempted to mediate between India and Pakistan in moments of crisis, including after the Pahalgam attack. The roles are reversible because the underlying logic is the same. States in the region oscillate between conflict and mediation, often within the same crisis cycle, without resolving the structural drivers of either.
Pakistan’s defenders argue that mediation should be judged independently of past behavior. That a state can evolve. That diplomacy, even if imperfect, is preferable to escalation. There is some truth in that. Pakistan’s ability to keep channels open between Washington and Tehran may have prevented a faster slide into a broader war.
But diplomacy is not only about access. It is about trust.
And trust is cumulative.
Pakistan’s record does not inspire confidence that it can sustain the role it now seeks to play. Its mediation is transactional, dependent on personalities and immediate incentives rather than anchored in a stable strategic doctrine. Even in the Iran talks, questions have already emerged about how much influence Islamabad actually commands, and whether key actors see it as a broker or merely a convenient venue.
The anniversary of Pahalgam sharpens this reality. It reminds the region that Pakistan’s most immediate and consequential conflict remains unresolved, and that its conduct within that conflict continues to undermine its broader ambitions.
In the end, Pakistan is not an unlikely peacemaker. It is a predictable one. A state that mediates where it must and destabilizes where it can.
That is not diplomacy. That is strategy under constraint.