Since 1979, Iran has been portrayed as a “revolutionary state” governed by a theocracy; however, it is currently evolving into a military state. The Iranian government, formed post-revolution, is a theocratic system that includes an elected civil administration and military officials; however, these bodies are subordinate to a clerical Guardian Council, which is overseen by a supreme leader possessing veto authority over state and religious matters.

Following the 1979 revolution, Iran’s clerical rulers formed the IRGC, referred to in Persian as Sepāh e Pāsdārān e Enqelāb e Eslāmi, to serve as a counterweight to the conventional military forces, which they viewed with skepticism. The command structure of IRGC reports only to the supreme leader, bypassing the elected president. The IRGC ultimately became one of the most powerful government entities in the country, created as the principal protector of the 1979 revolution. The IRGC has exerted considerable influence on Iran’s national politics, although indirectly. A plethora of IRGC veterans ascended to significant governmental responsibilities, including positions in the cabinet, parliament, and provincial administrations. The guards were subservient to previous Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who, despite various hurdles, was a pragmatic participant in the Iranian political landscape. Khamenei skillfully preserved an equilibrium among the IRGC, the clergy (Valiyat-e-Faqih), and civilian governance. The Supreme Leader continues to be a crucial source of legitimacy for the IRGC.

This power dynamic has experienced a total shift. The IRGC has evolved from a prominent political player to a de-facto ruler. This transition transpired following the appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as the supreme leader. The IRGC did not solely benefit from his rise to power. It coordinated it. The Revolutionary Guards are believed to have compelled the Assembly of Experts (Valiyat-e-Faqih) to hold an emergency online session on March 3, applying considerable pressure for Mojtaba’s appointment. At least eight members of the 88-member legislature refrained from participating in the session, citing what they described as “intense pressure” from the Guards to achieve a predetermined outcome.

Mojtaba Khamenei had fostered a symbiotic connection with the Guards for two decades. The Guards endorsed a candidate who was wholly reliant on them and, incapacitated and obscured from public view, could offer them nothing more than a title. A prominent Iranian expert, during a discussion with Euronews on March 9, asserted that “Mojtaba cannot succeed his father—the IRGC holds all the power.” The assessment mirrors the structural reality. Ali Khamenei devoted 35 years to establishing a network of personal relationships with IRGC commanders, seminary leaders, civilian leaders and intelligence directors, allowing him to maneuver and equilibrate competing power centers. Mojtaba possesses no equivalent network, akin to that of his father. His authority, however restricted, is entirely dependent on the IRGC’s willingness to simulate its presence.

Iran International, a Persian news channel based in London, reported that tensions between the Pezeshkian administration and Iran’s military leadership have culminated in a “complete political deadlock” for the president, with the Revolutionary Guard effectively usurping control over critical state functions. The IRGC has impeded presidential appointments and decisions while creating a security perimeter around the center of power, thus marginalizing the government from executive authority. This observation seems precise based on recent senior-level appointments. The president’s efforts to choose a new intelligence minister allegedly faltered due to direct pressure from IRGC chief General Ahmad Vahidi. All proposed candidates, including Hossein Dehghan, were rejected. Gen. Vahidi allegedly stated that, owing to wartime conditions, all critical and sensitive leadership positions must be nominated and supervised directly by the IRGC until further notice.

President Pezeshkian has consistently sought an urgent meeting with Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei; however, these requests have gone unfulfilled, and no communication has been established. Reliable sources suggest that a “military council” made up of senior IRGC officers now has full control over important decisions, creating a security barrier around Mojtaba Khamenei and preventing crucial information about the country’s situation from reaching him.

The conviction that guards hold veto power over all major governmental appointments and decisions is bolstered by the recent appointment of Gen. Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, a former deputy commander of the IRGC, as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), succeeding the notable Ali Larijani. The government appointed a veteran from the IRGC instead of a diplomat, technocrat, or prominent political figure, whose experience includes asymmetric warfare, internal security, institutional coordination, and coercive governance.

This step signifies that the Islamic government is reinforcing its central decision-making structure around the top leadership of the IRGC. The IRGC is acutely aware of its public image; it wishes to be viewed as the nation’s vanguard rather than a negotiator, which is why it abstains from negotiations publicly. Nonetheless, in private, they represent the actual power hub accountable for determining all decisions about a ceasefire, maritime de-escalation, or an extensive nuclear and missile framework.

The IRGC appears to be the central authority in Tehran, sidelining clerics and civilian officials. Historical evidence indicates that when a military-intelligence establishment attains structural supremacy, civilian authorities rarely reclaim lost ground without a catastrophic military defeat that discredits the generals.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)