Kissinger’s Uncomfortable Lesson for Two Vulnerable Allies
Henry Kissinger would have understood the predicament confronting Israel and South Korea. Both countries are technologically advanced democracies that rely heavily on the United States for their security. They are also faced with adversaries that are equipped with missiles, drones, cyber capabilities and irregular forces. Most importantly, both countries could confront a major security crisis while Washington is already preoccupied with another theater.
As for South Korea, China’s provocation against Taiwan—either a full-fledged landing operation or a naval blockade—would likely draw American aircraft, naval assets, intelligence assets, and ammunition to the Taiwan Strait. In that scenario, North Korea would not need to invade South Korea to exploit the uncertainty. To test whether Washington could simultaneously manage two contingencies in East Asia, Pyongyang could launch missiles, conduct maritime infiltration, or employ a limited nuclear threat.
Israel faces a comparable problem. Iran could directly threaten Israel while also applying pressure through missiles, drones, and affiliated armed organizations. The danger is increasingly becoming trans-regional: North Korea has contributed to Iran’s missile development, and Russia’s relationship with both countries offers an additional route for military learning, technological exchange, and diplomatic protection. Russia and North Korea’s expanding military cooperation, which includes missile supply and troop deployment, ultimately enables Pyongyang to gain access to operational experience that could be helpful to other American adversaries.
To be sure, China, Russia and North Korea do not operate as a unified alliance that has a joint command structure. Nevertheless, they increasingly benefit from each other’s confrontation with the United States: conflict in one region would ineluctably consume America’s missile interceptors, intelligence coverage, strategic attention, and industrial capacity that could be needed elsewhere.
Yet material scarcity is only one constraint on American commitments. Even when the United States possesses the capability to support an ally, Washington’s assistance has never been entirely detached from its broader strategic interests. The history of American alliance management therefore offers another reason for Israel and South Korea to strengthen their capacity for self-reliance. Kissinger’s dealings with both countries provide particularly revealing........
