Israel’s Quiet Green Light: How Gaza’s New Technocrats Could Become Jerusalem’s Best Bet 

The next phase in Gaza may be shaped less by militants and generals than by a small group of Gaza‑born technocrats now sitting in Washington, D.C. Their vehicle is the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG). Whether it becomes an asset or a liability for Israel will depend on whether Jerusalem treats it as a strategic tool—or just another problem to block.

NCAG is not Hamas and not the Ramallah political class. It is a 15‑member civilian team, endorsed by the United States and key Arab states, built to run Gaza’s basic services under international oversight. Most strikingly, the list of members did not appear out of nowhere: Palestinian factions, including Hamas and Fatah, agreed on the candidates, and Israel then vetted the list before it was finalized and announced. This is one of the rare Gaza structures that all key players have quietly signed off on—and that Israel has already, in effect, approved.

At the center is Dr. Ali Shaath, the Chief Commissioner. Born in Khan Younis in 1958, he is a civil engineer with a PhD in infrastructure planning from Queen’s University in the UK. He has held senior posts in Palestinian planning and transport ministries and chaired the Palestinian Industrial Estates and Free Zones Authority. He was chosen because he knows how to move complex projects from blueprint to execution and how to speak the language of donors, diplomats, and engineers at the same time.

On health, the key figure is Dr. Ayed (Aed) Yaghi, head of the Palestinian Medical Relief Society in Gaza. During the war, he became a visible public voice warning that hospitals were collapsing and disease was spreading in shelters. He brings medical credibility, emergency‑response experience, and direct links to international health organizations that will bankroll much of Gaza’s recovery.

Housing and reconstruction are led by Osama al‑Saadawi, a civil engineer from Rafah’s refugee camps with a master’s degree from the Islamic University of Gaza. He has run the Palestinian Housing Council in Gaza and served as a PA minister for entrepreneurship and empowerment. He understands both how to rebuild entire neighborhoods and how sensitive land, refugee claims, and camp politics really are.

Around them sit other sector specialists: a public‑finance veteran, an education administrator, a telecommunications engineer, a justice and courts figure, a municipal services and water manager, a long‑time social and women’s advocate, and a respected tribal mediator. They were picked because they can open doors—to ministries, donors, NGOs, and local constituencies—and because their CVs make sense in Washington and European capitals now holding the reconstruction purse.

From Israel’s standpoint, the goals in Gaza are brutally simple: prevent Hamas from rebuilding, avoid retaking full responsibility, and keep the U.S. firmly in the lead. NCAG was designed inside that triangle as the civilian counterpart to a U.S.‑led Board of Peace and any future security arrangements. Jerusalem has already exercised a quiet veto over who sits on it. The remaining question is whether it will now use that leverage—or walk away from it.

So far, Israel’s stance has been mostly blocking: no entry for NCAG members into Gaza, public complaints about the committee’s logo and PA symbolism, and reluctance to treat the body as any kind of partner. That may feel safe, but it leaves the vacuum to be filled by exactly the forces Israel fears most: Hamas’s rebuilt networks, freelance militias, and foreign agendas written far from Jerusalem.

If Israel wants Gaza to move in a more manageable direction, it should treat NCAG as a project to design, not just an object to resist. Five concise moves would change the picture:

1. Appoint a single empowered liaison to handle all NCAG‑related requests on movement, personnel, materials, and projects, turning scattered vetoes into accountable decisions.

2. Allow a small, vetted NCAG team into areas where the IDF has pulled back, with a narrow mandate—water, sewage, electricity, basic clinics, and schools—and judge them by results.

3. Link every expansion of NCAG’s role to clear security benchmarks: joint vetting for police, safeguards against courts shielding militants, and demilitarization guarantees around major housing projects.

4. Use NCAG to stand up a vetted, internationally supervised police force that handles everyday order under strict firewalls from Hamas’s security apparatus, reducing the need for constant Israeli incursions.

5. Shape donor involvement by insisting that all significant funding to NCAG comes with transparency, independent audits, non‑cooperation with armed groups, and regular joint reviews with Washington.

From Washington’s side, expectations for NCAG are blunt: stabilize basic services quickly where the IDF has withdrawn, become the primary civilian address for reconstruction, and build enough administrative capacity that security arrangements are not dragged into fixing pipes and roofs every week. None of that clashes with Israeli interests. In fact, it supports a cautious Israeli strategy that lowers costs and visibility while keeping the U.S. fully engaged.

The alternatives are not theoretical. One path leads to a “new” Hamas‑run Gaza under a fresh label. Another leads to fragmented militias and warlords. A third leads to Israel sliding back into direct responsibility for two million people because no one else can keep the lights on.

NCAG offers something different: Gaza’s civilian life managed by Gaza‑born professionals like Ali Shaath, Ayed Yaghi, and Osama al‑Saadawi, chosen through a process that involved Palestinian factions and international actors—and vetted by Israel itself. It operates under a U.S.‑anchored framework, depends on Israeli cooperation, and can be bound by explicit security conditions. It will not turn Gaza into a friendly neighbor overnight. But it can make the Strip more governable, less explosive, and far less of a daily burden.

The choice now sits in Jerusalem. Keep the door shut, and NCAG will remain a committee in exile while others rush to fill the space on their own terms. Set firm rules, open narrow but real channels, and demand that this team of technocrats prove themselves under those rules, and NCAG can become both a buffer and a lever in one of the most dangerous arenas on Israel’s map.

Helping NCAG succeed on Israeli terms is not a favor to Gaza. It is a strategic bet that, for once, the people designing the next chapter on Israel’s border will be people it has already helped choose.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)